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INTRODUCTION 
Modern information and communication technologies (ICTs) have created new 
ways for doing old things. Working, playing, shopping, participating in events 
and discussions are increasingly reliant on the transmission and receipt of data. 
It is possible to note that regardless of the verbs we use in describing our “on-
line” activities, such activities are all inherently rooted in and dependent upon 
communication. Consequently, this means that violating social norms, including 
committing crimes, has also been adapted to the newer way of being. Since 
crime is a socially constructed phenomenon (Posick, 2018), it goes where 
people go. 
While modern communication technology has made it possible to easily 
contact people regardless of their physical location, the use of such technologies 
and the access to vast amounts of information increasingly causes people to 
experience the effects of information overload (Gunaratne et al., 2020), i.e. an 
adverse state in which a decision-maker’s usual cognitive abilities are hindered. 
Hence, the previously described situation is exacerbated by the fact that some, 
who make use of the same possibilities afforded by modern technology and the 
easy access it provides, do so for the purposes of committing crimes (Study 
IV), i.e. cybercrimes (see also McGuire & Dowling, 2013). In fact, the rates of 
globally perpetrated cybercriminal acts have been rapidly increasing (Purple-
Sec, 2021) and show no signs of slowing down.  
According to a recent report (Proofpoint, 2019: 19), 99% of cybercrime 
threats require some human interaction – opening a file, following a link or 
opening a document – by the recipient to be successful. This means that the 
malicious use of social engineering, which is defined in modern security discus-
sions as acts that influence a person to take an action that is not in their best 
interests (see 2.3 below; Hadnagy, 2018; Hatfield, 2018), is key to criminals’ 
success (Proofpoint, 2019).  
Acknowledging the role played by social engineering and, in particular, 
influencing in the growing problem of cybercrime is to also recognise that pre-
vention efforts must be focussed on a specific moment in time, i.e. the brief 
period of time between a person receiving a message and taking action based on 
their interpretation of the content received (see e.g. McAlaney & Hills, 2020). 
Since people’s awareness of the cybercrime problem is increasing concurrently 
with a decrease of confidence in being able to stay safe online (European 
Commission, 2020) and the applicability of current criminological theories to 
the problem of cybercrime are considered inconclusive at best (Button & Cross, 
2017; Study IV), we need a new approach to understanding technology-
mediated crime. 
In my thesis, I argue that this approach, which I call crime-as-communi-
cation, can be provided by combining aspects of environmental criminology 
(how criminals and crime targets converge in space and time: Felson & Cohen, 
1979) with ideas from the disciplines of law (how a crime target’s “will to act” 
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is envisioned and understood in criminal offences such as fraud and extortion), 
communication (how meaning is encoded, transmitted and understood: Hall, 
1973; Levine, 2019) and social psychology (what techniques are used to in-
fluence people to gain their compliance in crimes requiring action by the victim: 
Cialdini, 2009) as well as media sociology and the sociology of deviance. 
The prevention of victimisation that entails from crime acts committed as 
communicative acts, which rely on deception and manipulated messages-in-
context, can only occur if the deception embedded in the message that is further 
amplified by its context is detected. According to Levine (2019), people, by 
default, assume that communication is truthful, because this disposition helps us 
function in a social world. Because intentional deception is the exception not 
the rule (Levine, 2019), people are also more vulnerable to instances where 
deceptive practices are in fact employed by those producing the messages (Hall, 
1973). In order for suspicion to arise about the content of certain acts of 
communication, there must be a triggering event, i.e. something in the message 
must constitute ‘diagnostically useful information’ (Levine, 2019) that triggers 
a person to suspect deception (and, consequently, the potentially criminal nature 
of the communication).  
Recipients’ detection of deception carries significance for another reason: 
the fact of just how alone we are in that brief moment between receiving a mes-
sage and deciding what to do next. Suggesting that third persons, e.g. parents, 
colleagues or law enforcement officers, are able to intervene on behalf of the 
recipient, i.e. act as capable guardians against crime (Felson & Cohen, 1979), 
would require said third persons to have real-time access to our communications 
(Study IV). Thus, the protective role of others, e.g. parents protecting their 
children or law enforcement officers protecting the public, is severely dimi-
nished in the particular moment of the communicative act. In other words, 
knowledge about the mechanics and inner workings of scams is crucial.  
The aforementioned knowledge can be fostered preventively by parents 
(Smahel et al., 2020), places of employment (MacEwan, 2017; Nguyen, Jensen, 
Durcikova, & Wright, 2020) or public awareness campaigns (Sasse & Smith, 
2016; Button & Cross, 2017; Whitty, 2019), or learned “the hard way” after the 
fact (Button & Cross, 2017). Nevertheless, due to the rapid nature of 
technology-mediated communications, the target of a crime (the recipient) can 
only rely on their own current knowledge regarding the initial interpretation of 
incoming (crime-as-)communication, because asking for help or seeking verifi-
cation from external sources already assumes that something in the original 
communication triggered suspicion in the recipient. 
Although susceptibility to social engineering attacks has become a popular 
research topic (see Nguyen, Jensen, Durcikova, & Wright, 2020: Appendix A), 
research about the content of social engineering attacks, e.g. which persuasive 
strategies are used by criminals when crafting socially engineered messages and 
how these appear in the messages (Kim & Kim, 2013; Wright, Jensen, 
Thatcher, Dinger, & Marett, 2014; Carter, 2015; Zielinska, Welk, Mayhorn, & 
Murphy-Hill, 2016; Stojnic, Vatsalan, & Arachchilage, 2021), is still lacking. 
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This lack of focus on persuasive content itself limits our understanding on what 
constitutes relevant diagnostically useful information. Even less is known about 
the influence that immediate social context has on the ways in which perpetra-
tors produce (Verma, Crane, & Gnawalli, 2018; Steinmetz, Pimentel, & Roe, 
2021) and recipients interpret (Greene, Steves, Theofanos, & Kostic, 2018) the 
content of phishing attacks. Phishing attacks are social engineering attacks com-
monly perpetrated via email (Khonji, Iraqi, & Jones, 2013), but also through 
text messages (SMS phishing or smishing) and phone calls (voice phishing or 
vishing) (Hong, 2012). 
Hence, if the key to criminals’ success in 99% of cybercrimes is deceiving 
recipients into doing their bidding by using persuasive messages(-in-context), 
then the solution to preventing 99% of cybercrimes must start with providing 
recipients with the knowledge necessary for detecting the aforementioned 
deception. 
Thus, the aim of my thesis is to explain the role and importance of inter-
preting messages-in-context to distinguish potentially criminal input from 
all received input for the purpose of preventing victimisation from social 
engineering attacks. 
The thesis is based on four articles, of which three are empirical studies 
(Study I, Study II, Study III) and one (Study IV) presents a theoretical criti-
cism of current criminological thought. The arguments I present in my thesis 
operate in an international context and address universal phenomena, i.e. the 
use, and the interpretation of the content, of deceptive communication in social 
engineering attacks. 
The cover text is structured as follows. Firstly, I will set the problem and 
provide reasons why there is an urgent need to better our understanding of me-
diated crimes, including cybercrimes, in particular with respect to the changing 
responsibilities of and increased expectations placed upon individuals. In 
Chapter 2, I provide the theoretical background which lead me from the study 
of environmental criminology proper to an approach that is motivated by en-
vironmental criminology but situated within a communication-based framework 
and present my research questions. In Chapter 3, I describe the methods used in 
the studies that form the basis for this cover text, and in Chapter 4, I provide the 
results and analysis of the results of the previously mentioned empirical studies. 
Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the results as answers to my research ques-
tions and further motivations for and benefits of adopting the crime-as-
communication approach to the study of mediated and cybercrimes. 
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1. SETTING THE PROBLEM 
The core problem under discussion in my thesis is how insights from communi-
cation can inform, instruct and potentially mitigate the negative outcomes from 
cybercriminal acts targeting individuals. However, and as with any academic 
endeavour, the ideas that ultimately shape the arguments presented in the fol-
lowing text are framed and influenced by what has been done before. For 
instance, while the core of my arguments emerge from a synthesis of oppor-
tunity theories of crime (see Chapter 2.1) and scholarship on deceptive commu-
nication in the form of social engineering (see Chapter 2.3), these approaches 
function well on a small scale, i.e. on the level of the crime act itself. Although 
useful in the role I have assigned them, the previously mentioned approaches 
require additional help from concepts that aid in framing the importance of the 
work I present. Thus, before diving the reader into the minutia of criminological 
thought as well as the historical and current understanding of ‘social engi-
neering’, I am obligated to explain what lead me to choose such theoretical 
approaches and not others. 
The point of departure may seem like an odd one: the adoption and entry 
into force of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 concerning measures for a high com-
mon level of security of network and information systems across the (European) 
Union (Directive (EU) 2016/1148). This piece of legislation is also referred to 
as “the NIS Directive” (network and information security) (Markopoulou, Papa-
konstantinou, & De Hert, 2019), and at this point, should further be understood 
as “the original” version, given that the Commission submitted a proposal for 
version 2.0 in late 2020. The significance of the NIS Directive came, primarily, 
from it being the first legislative proposal aimed at creating a Union-wide ap-
proach to cybersecurity. The EU defines cybersecurity as “activities necessary 
to protect network and information systems, the users of such systems, and 
other persons affected by cyber threats” (Regulation (EU) 2019/881). 
In two official documents, an impact assessment accompanying the proposal 
for the original NIS Directive (European Commission, 2013) and a Joint Com-
munication following the adoption of the Directive (European Commission, 
2017), the issue of “human error” as a problem for cybersecurity is raised. In 
the impact assessment (European Commission, 2013), human error is included 
alongside a variety of factors, e.g. natural events, technical failures and mali-
cious attacks, contributing to the occurrence of cyber incidents (or accidents). In 
the Joint Communication (European Commission, 2017), the approach to 
human error became more specific, as the document cited a survey by IBM 
Global Technology Services (2014), which suggested that 95% of (cyber)-
security incidents recognise “human error” as a contributing factor. As noted 
above, this number has now increased to 99% (Proofpoint, 2019). Furthermore, 
in its Cybersecurity Act (Regulation (EU) 2019/881: recital 8), the European 
Union also institutionalised the concept of cyber-hygiene, i.e. “simple, routine 
measures that, where implemented and carried out regularly by citizens, 
13 
organisations and businesses, minimise their exposure to risks from cyber 
threats”. 
Thus, an issue that a union of sovereign states deems inescapably important 
lead that same union to compel private companies to implement “appropriate 
and proportionate technical and organisational measures to manage the risks 
posed to the security of networks and information systems” (Directive (EU) 
2016/1148: art 14). Since companies are legal abstractions (subjects of law 
established pursuant to law, General Part of the Civil Code Act, § 24; see also 
Naffine, 2003), i.e. companies can be established, dissolved, sold, acquired, 
merged and divided but you still cannot point your finger at a “company”, the 
responsibility for carrying out those security measures is placed on employees, 
managers and executives. In other words, the people considered to be a 
contributing factor to 95–99% of security incidents (IBM Global Technology 
Services, 2014; Proofpoint, 2019) became the vehicles for organisational and, 
implicitly, state-level cybersecurity. 
This notion, i.e. a state encouraging or compelling individuals to acknow-
ledge and assume a degree of responsibility for managing their own risks 
(Burchell, 1996: 6), is known as “responsibilisation”. Burchell (1996) and 
Garland (1996) were the first to use this concept in the social sciences (referred 
to in Brown, 2021). Garland (1996), in particular, applied the concept of 
responsibilisation to the issue of crime control. Garland viewed this responsibi-
lisation strategy as the central government’s effort to “act upon crime not in a 
direct fashion through state agencies” (1996: 452), e.g. police, courts, prisons or 
social work, but instead operate indirectly and activate private actors and 
persuade them to act appropriately. 
As mentioned earlier, while human error was highlighted as a contributing 
factor to security incidents, malicious attacks were also included in the discus-
sion of threats (European Commission, 2013). Broadly taken, threats to organi-
sational cybersecurity come from 1) malicious insiders, 2) outsiders, 3) a 
combination of 1 and 2 or 4) inadvertent actors (IBM Global Technology 
Services, 2014). Aside from inadvertent actors, the remaining sources of threats 
certainly call into consideration the possibility of criminal activity. 
Regarding the previously mentioned general threat distribution, more than 
50% of IT decision-makers (PurpleSec, 2021) claim that the main threat to their 
organisation is phishing. Furthermore, a recent survey assessed 81% of em-
ployees to be “risky” when it comes to detecting phishing attacks (MediaPro, 
2020). Moreover, when employees are forced into a remote work situation, e.g. 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, employees themselves admit to increasing 
their employer’s cybersecurity risks (Help Net Security, 2021). Hence, we are at 
an impasse – the state compels private companies to adopt appropriate technical 
and organisational cybersecurity measures; in practice, carrying out such tasks 
falls on employees, managers and executives, i.e. people, and the personnel is 
consistently considered as “risky” when it comes to the primary threat, i.e. 
phishing attacks, that companies face.  
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Since phishing attacks, which fall under the category of “outsider threats”, 
are also crimes (Study I), it means that employees are also involved in, and 
essentially tasked with, crime control. While most of us would probably agree 
that it is a good idea to lock your door at night, it is not an obligation enforced 
by the possibility of sanctions. Being taught or asked to lock the door is vastly 
different from the state obligating you to do so, even if implicitly and in a 
“trickle-down” fashion (Study IV). Furthermore, the concept of responsibi-
lisation has helped to highlight the problem with respect to employees working 
for companies subject to relevant security obligations. It does not, however, 
even begin to address the larger social problem regarding people whose aware-
ness of the cybercrime problem is increasing but whose confidence in their 
ability to stay safe online is decreasing (European Commission, 2020). The pre-
viously described issue is exacerbated by the fact that even law enforcement 
rarely knows the background of the criminals perpetrating deception-based 
cyber-attacks (Button, Lewis, & Tapley, 2009: 13), no one demographic is con-
sidered more or less vulnerable to such deceptive acts, and we lack a consensus 
on the underlying psychological reasons for why people comply with mediated 
fraudulent requests (Norris, Brookes, & Dowell, 2019).  
Nevertheless, because each phishing attack is a crime or an attempt at one 
(Study I), we can start untangling this social problem by focussing on phishing 
attacks as specific crime acts. In current criminological thought, opportunity 
theories of crime stand out due to their focus on the crime act, not the criminals 
(Clarke, 2013), and thus provide a suitable point of departure. While phishing 
attacks are crimes or crime attempts, they are, at the same time, communicated 
acts of social engineering, i.e. acts that influence “a person to take an action that 
may or may not be in their best interests” (Hadnagy, 2018: 7). Therefore, to 
understand the threat of phishing attacks, it is important to understand both 1) 
the crime act and 2) the communicative act.  In essence, we need to understand 
the violation of social norms in the form of criminal activity (as opposed to law-
ful activities) and deceptive communication (as opposed to truthful commu-
nication). 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Opportunity theories of crime:  
the routine activities approach 
Although wrought with institutional resistance and initial struggles for accep-
tance (Felson, 2008; Felson & Clarke, 2011), opportunity theories of crime have 
now become the mainstay of criminological thought (Wilcox & Cullen, 2018). 
According to Brantingham and Brantingham (1981), there are four dimensions 
to understanding crime: the legal dimension, the offender dimension, the victim 
dimension and the place (or situational) dimension. As opposed to traditional 
criminology (see Felson, 2019: 612; Andresen, 2010: 6–7), which focusses 
primarily on the first three dimensions and seeks to understand criminal moti-
vation and criminality, the environmental criminology approach concerns itself 
with the fourth dimension of place and/or the crime situation. The term “en-
vironmental criminology” was coined by Jeffery in his book Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental Design (1971, as cited in Andresen, 2010: 6) as a call 
for the establishment of a new school of thought in criminology. 
The first complete approach published as a journal article or book chapter in 
the environmental criminology literature was the routine activity approach by 
Felson & Cohen (1979; see also Andresen, 2010: 13–15). Provided that the 
routine activity approach was a clear break with ideas present in conventional 
criminological thought at the time, in particular with social disorganization 
theory (Andresen, 2010), Felson has described in detail the institutional 
resistance the approach met at first and how difficult it was to get the original 
work published (2008). This struggle is not unique and was similarly expe-
rienced by other proponents of the environmental criminology approach (see the 
historical account by Ronald Clarke in Felson & Clarke, 2011). 
The routine activity approach was sourced from Amos Hawley’s (1950) 
study of human ecology and focussed on the daily, regular activities of indivi-
duals (as distributed in time and space) as these routines and activities produced 
opportunities for predatory criminal exploitation. In their foundational work, 
Felson & Cohen (1979) analyse how activities away from the household in a 
post-World War II United States contributed to increases in burglaries. In other 
words, the way in which people’s routine activities changed directly contributed 
to increases in criminal opportunity even though quality of life was on the rise 
otherwise. 
The basic premise of the routine activities approach posits that most criminal 
acts “require convergence in space and time of likely offenders, suitable targets 
and the absence of capable guardians against crime” (emphasis in original) 
(Felson & Cohen, 1979: 588). Felson (2008) has explained the choice of ‘target’ 
instead of ‘victim’ to come from the fact that where criminals are after material 
possessions, e.g. valuables, the target and victim are not the same. Put diffe-
rently, when a burglar takes a TV from its owner, the owner is the victim but 
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the TV was the actual target from the offender’s perspective (Felson & Clarke, 
1998). Thus, if a likely offender and a suitable target, including where the target 
is a person, were to converge in space and time, crime is often the result. Hence, 
the capable guardian is the “element” whose absence allows for crime and 
whose presence can foil it. Over time, the theory has of course evolved with 
new elements such as handlers and place managers being added (see e.g. Eck, 
2003), but for better or worse, the combination of the three key elements of 
likely offenders, suitable targets and capable guardians is the most pronounced 
contribution associated with the routine activity approach (see Felson’s own 
account about such concerns in Felson, 2008). 
Since its first publication more than 40 years ago, the routine activity ap-
proach has been extensively applied in criminological research regarding so-
called ‘terrestrial’ crime (Spano & Freilich, 2009; Wilcox & Cullen, 2018; see 
also Perkins, Howell, Dodge, Burruss, & Maimon, 2020: 3–4), i.e. crime with-
out a pronounced technology-mediated element that occurs, as Pease (2001) 
memorably dubbed it, in “meatspace”. When issues of computer-related crime 
first emerged into criminological inquiry in the early 2000s (Grabosky, 2001; 
Capeller, 2001), the debate focussed on whether existing criminological theory 
is sufficient for explaining and predicting criminal acts in the new environment, 
i.e. “cyberspace”. Given the dominance of the routine activity approach, it is 
somewhat unsurprising that Grabosky (2001) singled it out as a way of ex-
plaining the emerging problem of computer-related offences. Even so, a full 
account of how the routine activity approach may be applied to technology-
mediated crime, i.e. how the now well-known constitutive elements may be 
transposed to explain criminal acts occurring in ‘cyberspace’, was proposed 
slightly later by Yar (2005). In fact, Yar’s account remains the oft-cited source 
for transposing the routine activities into the technology-mediated environment 
and was recently revisited by Leukfeldt & Yar (2016). 
Although the routine activity approach has, by now, also seen ample 
application in the realm of cybercrime (Holt & Bossler, 2008; Bossler & Holt, 
2009; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016), the results are often mixed (Leukfeldt & Yar, 
2016) with respect to which elements of the approach can explain the occur-
rence of cybercrimes. In particular, this concerns the element of the capable 
guardian or guardianship in general, as the absence of this element suggests that 
a crime act will be successful (Felson & Cohen, 1979).  
Lack of clarity on what exactly constitutes ‘capable guardianship’ is a core 
issue of the routine activities approach – cybercrime or otherwise – because it is 
incredibly easy to keep analyses at the level of a statement that merely suggests 
victimisation occurred because the capable guardian was absent. In fact, Pratt & 
Turanovic (2016) present a criticism of this inherent tautology in the routine 
activity approach, i.e. victimisation is the outcome of the convergence of likely 
offenders and suitable targets in the absence of capable guardians, thus when 
these elements co-occur, victimisation is the result. The problem here, as I also 
account for it in Study IV, is that the basic theoretical notions of the routine 
activity approach, while easy to comprehend initially, ultimately say very little 
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about the abilities or capabilities of the guardian or, for that matter, who could 
take up the function of the guardian, i.e. who could potentially foil the suc-
cessful completion of a crime act.  
Routine activity approach ‘hard-liners’ suggest that guardians are to be 
understood as separate from the target (Hollis, Felson, & Welsh, 2013), even 
though taking such a position would present clear negative implications for the 
study of technology-mediated crime. This is the case primarily because inter-
ventions into the convergence of offenders and targets by third persons are often 
difficult to propose given the personal nature of using digital devices (Study 
IV). Given that debates about who (or what) ought to be considered as the 
‘capable guardian’ are ongoing (see e.g. Buil-Gil, Lord, & Barrett, 2021: 289), I 
discuss this particular element of the routine activities approach further below. 
 
 
2.2 The role of guardians and guardianship in crime acts 
As mentioned above and discussed at length in Study IV, the main debate re-
garding the ‘guardian’ (or ‘guardianship’) concept comes down to whether the 
guardian is always to be considered as separate from the target, e.g. a (random) 
third person whose presence may deter crime (Felson & Boba, 2010; Hollis, 
Felson, & Welsh, 2013; Miró-Llinares, 2015), or if there is an argument to be 
made for protecting one’s own person (Study IV). Of note here is that Felson & 
Cohen (1979: 590) mention in a footnote of the original work that “the ana-
lytical distinction between target and guardian is not important in those cases 
where a personal target engages in self-protection”. Hence, Felson and Cohen 
originally never closed the door on the possibility of at least considering self-
protection, although later authors have taken this to be a hard rule (see e.g. 
Miro-Llinares, 2015)1. With respect to guardians and guardianship, Felson him-
self seems to be ambiguous about the clarity of it, supporting or at least not ex-
cluding such an interpretation in some sources (Felson & Cohen, 1979; Felson, 
2014 (archive interview); Felson, 2019: 619), while underwriting the opposite 
(Hollis, Felson, & Welsh, 2013) or keeping the account unclear (Felson & 
Boba, 2010) in others.  
In their critical reappraisal of the concept, Hollis-Peel and colleagues (2011) 
additionally note that the guardianship aspect of the routine activity approach 
was dormant in terms of a research agenda for a long time. Conversely, the idea 
of self-protection or, at minimum, the potential for self-protection specifically 
with respect to cybercrimes was tentatively present from the beginning of such 
inquiries (Grabosky, 2001; Grabosky & Smith, 2001), appearing alongside 
discussions of the routine activity approach. In particular, Grabosky & Smith 
(2001: 29) emphasise that “much computer-related illegality lies beyond the 
                                                 
1  It must be noted that Felson and Cohen parted ways soon after the publishing of the rou-
tine activity approach, where Felson stuck with and further developed the approach and 
Cohen returned to more conventional approaches to criminology (see Felson, 2008). 
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capacity of contemporary law enforcement”, which means that other institutions 
as well as a degree of self-help by potential victims plays a role. Other authors 
have also suggested various forms of guardianship that do not relate the guar-
dian concept solely to third persons, e.g. personal guardianship (Bossler & Holt, 
2009; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016) or guardianship in the form of knowledge and 
awareness (Hutchings & Hayes, 2009).  
Currently, authors tend to mention guardians as separate third persons along-
side the self-protective behaviours of a target (see e.g. Buil-Gil, Lord, & Barrett, 
2021: 289–290). Thus, guardianship and (self-)protective behaviours tend to be 
discussed as separates within the context of organisational settings (Buil-Gil, 
Lord, & Barrett, 2021; see also Stockman, Nedelec, & Mackey, 2016) where 
applying the concept of “social guardianship” (Spano & Nagy, 2005: 418) is 
feasible as a consideration. Nevertheless, non-cybercrime studies have shown 
that guardians need to be available, capable and willing to act (Reynald, 2009) 
and that only people directly responsible for supervision actually fulfil the role 
of a guardian (Collie & Greene, 2016). This inevitably brings us back to the 
notion of ‘responsibilisation’ and the fact that such responsibilities are, in fact, 
placed on people within work settings (Study IV).  
Given that people only spend about 35–50 hours a week working (Eurostat, 
2019), most of our time is spent away from work. What is more, we now spend 
increasing amounts of our time “alone together” (Turkle, 2011), i.e. connected 
but alone, and home users are considered to be more vulnerable to different 
cyber risks (Kritzinger & von Solms, 2010). Thus, the arguments for successful 
intervention by third persons are questionable at best (Study IV), inclusive of 
issues related to the availability of capable guardians against cybercrime in 
general. In particular, we have to take into account that only 59% of internet 
users in the EU think they can protect themselves sufficiently against cyber-
crime (European Commission, 2020). Furthermore, there is an important diffe-
rence between perceived knowledge and actual knowledge about a topic such as 
cybersecurity, where greater perceived knowledge or higher perceived response 
costs can make people less motivated to take actual protective action (De 
Kimpe, Walrave, Verdegem, & Ponnet, 2021; Bax, McGill, & Hobbs, 2021), 
not to mention voluntarily doing so for someone else without first receiving a 
relevant request from them. With respect to home or other private environ-
ments, the latter could additionally be considered as subject matter for the 
privacy-security trade-off debate (see e.g. Solove, 2011), i.e. intruding into 
someone’s private sphere without invitation. 
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Figure 1. In the absence of third person direct (G)uardians, (T)argets protect themselves 
from the actions of (O)ffenders in the (M)ediated point of convergence. 
 
 
Hence, where direct interventions by third persons are excluded from conside-
ration in technology-mediated environments (Figure 1), the outcome of the 
mediated convergence is determined by an interaction between the offender and 
its target. The absence of a third person guardian does not, however, auto-
matically mean that crime occurs. For instance, Eck & Madensen (2015) have 
explicitly suggested considering offenders, targets and guardians as roles that 
people switch between throughout the day. Thus, where a target and a guardian 
are considered as roles, it is also possible to propose that a person can carry 
these two roles simultaneously, i.e. be the target of a criminal offence but also 
protect him- or herself. Here, it is important to also note proactive and reactive 
roles available to third persons such as family or colleagues and entities such as 
service providers. Targets are to be considered “alone” in terms of the imme-
diate contact with the sender. By no means does this suggest, for example, that 
third persons are not involved in educating the target (proactive) or helping with 
aftercare (reactive) (Figure 1). Service providers can take technical measures to 
decrease the overall number of unwanted mediated interactions (proactive) (see 
e.g. Priezkalns, 2019). Similarly, service providers are able to react to notifi-
cations of illegal activities in their networks or services, e.g. block unwanted 
web traffic where necessary or take down unlawful or harmful content (e.g. 
Kikerpill, Siibak, & Valli, 2021). 
As I mentioned in the introduction, regardless of the verbs we use to 
describe activities in technology-mediated environments, such activities are 
always rooted in and dependent upon communication. Thus, it is not by chance 
that, once third person guardians are removed from the model (Figure 1), the 
convergence of offenders and target/guardians appears as if depicting a basic 
communication model. The offender stands for the sender, the target/guardian 
stands for the recipient, and the mediated point of convergence stands for 
20 
transmitted messages. Hence, the crime act in technology-mediated environ-
ments is always concurrently a communicative act.  
From the perspective of the offender/sender, the successful completion of the 
criminal act means that an offender does what he or she intended to do (e.g. 
levying a threat against someone) or obtains the gains that he or she sought to 
obtain (e.g. illicit gains from fraud). From the perspective of the target-
guardian/recipient, the criminal offence can be prevented in two primary ways, 
depending on the type of criminal offence. Firstly, where the type of a criminal 
offence, e.g. a criminal threat or the posting of unlawful content, does not 
require further action by the target (see e.g. Jõgi, 2012), the only way of 
preventing victimisation is to close any channels that the perpetrator may use to 
carry out the crime act. The difficulty of preventing such crimes from occurring 
is apparent in the modern, ubiquitously connected way of being, including 
where service providers adopt a passive role (e.g. Drake, 2021) and must often 
be pressured into action (Aziz, 2020). 
The second type of offence, i.e. where further action or compliance is re-
quired from the target, can be prevented either by closing any open channels or, 
if the blocking proves unsuccessful, interpreting the received communication as 
unwanted, suspicious, criminal etc. and not reacting to the received transmission 
in a manner expected by the sender. However, criminal actors often manipulate 
the content and delivery of messages, i.e. socially engineer the communication, 
to increase the chances of gaining compliance from (unaware) recipients. 
 
 
2.3 Social engineering then and now 
The substantive idea behind the original meaning of social engineering, i.e. 
large-scale efforts to reshape social structures and reorder society in desirable 
directions (Fein, 2001: 122), is undoubtedly old. For instance, various reforms 
and legislative efforts in Ancient Rome have been discussed from the perspec-
tive of social engineering (see Sirks, 2013). While the practices are as old as 
human society, the terminology is newer. As a specific term, “social engi-
neering” emerged from an analogy in which mechanical engineering was com-
pared to bringing about social change in the mid-19th century (Gray, 1842: 117; 
Hatfield, 2018), i.e. how politicians could be likened to mechanical engineers 
trying to fix a steam engine. As Alexander & Schmidt (1996: 1) note, “the word 
engineering suggests the designing and erecting of structures and processes in 
which human beings serve as raw material”. 
According to Patel & Reichardt (2016: 9), the rise of social engineering in its 
original usage coincided with the “incremental creation of the modern inter-
ventionist and welfare state”. Following its emergence, the concept was further 
developed and understood through the prism of social and political change (e.g. 
Addams, 1914) and enjoyed large-scale optimism in the form of “targeted 
change” in the first half of the 20th century (Patel & Reichardt, 2016). Ac-
cording to Hatfield (2018: 104), social engineering terminology formed a part 
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of various discussions throughout most of the 20th century, but waned in 
popularity sometime in the end of the Cold War. While the use of specific 
terminology may have waned, it is important to note here that what Garland 
described as a “responsibilisation strategy” (see above; Garland, 1996) can be 
considered as falling under the category of social engineering. Thus, by proxy, 
the adoption of the NIS (network and information security) directive (Directive 
(EU) 2016/1148), and large-scale legislative action in general, are instances of 
social engineering in the original meaning of the concept, because such 
legislative action aims to “reorder society in desirable directions” (Fein, 2001: 
22). Understandably, the notion of “desirable directions” suggests that such 
chosen directions may be desirable for some but not others. 
As Hatfield notes, in the mid-1970s, the phrase “social engineering” was 
also introduced into the emerging ‘hacker culture’ (Draper, 2001 as cited in 
Hatfield, 2018: 105). However, the usage of the concept of social engineering in 
early hacker communities was disconnected from the concept’s original mea-
ning within political science (see Hatfield, 2018: 105). Put differently, the defi-
nition of social engineering as used in current cybersecurity literature (see 
above, Hadnagy, 2018) did not emerge from the original, political science 
approach to the concept. Nevertheless, the historical/political science under-
standing of social engineering (Fein, 2001) and the modern cybersecurity under-
standing of social engineering (e.g. Hadnagy, 2018) share some common traits 
(Hatfield, 2018). Hatfield suggests that these common traits include: 
• epistemic asymmetry, i.e. possessing superior knowledge; 
• technocratic dominance, i.e. possessing superior technical knowledge, which 
allows to enact changes “in the behaviour of others” (Hatfield, 2018: 104); 
• teleological replacement, i.e. replacing the purpose of the target of social 
engineering with one’s own. 
Although Hatfield’s (2018) arguments on the connections between the concept 
of social engineering as understood either in political science or cybersecurity 
provide valuable insight, he seems to also avoid addressing the darker side of 
the concept’s original manifestation. This missed notion is, for example, clearly 
present in the work of Patel & Reichardt (2016) when addressing Nazi social 
engineering in the 1930–1940s. Furthermore, Conroy (2017: 15) notes that 
defining or implementing the concept of social engineering was difficult until 
the rise of Nazism, which empowered “a political eugenicist more radical and 
extreme than even the most enthusiastic pioneer of social engineering could 
have imagined”2. Hence, the history of social engineering shows that the 
                                                 
2  I note that the eugenics movement was historically influenced by Renaissance, En-
lightenment and 19th century criminological thought, in particular by physiognomy (G. della 
Porta in the 16th century and J. K. Lavater in the 18th century), phrenology (F. J. Gall and J. 
Spurzheim in the 18th and 19th century) and the broad idea of “the criminal man” (C. 
Lombroso) (see Posick, 2018). The social engineering of the mid-19th to mid-20th century 
eugenicists, most notably in Nazi Germany (see Conroy, 2017), is not merely a horrific 
mistake of history – the forced sterilization of women continues today as a stark reminder of 
what came before and has not changed (see e.g. Patel, 2017). 
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concept has always had both the potential for progressive use (Hatfield, 2018) 
and horrific abuse (Conroy, 2017). Therefore, the manifestation of social en-
gineering within current social psychology literature more broadly (e.g. Cial-
dini, 2009), and in the ‘human hacking’/cybersecurity literature more speci-
fically (see e.g. Hadnagy, 2018), exhibits the same traits. Not all social en-
gineering carries an entirely negative connotation (Hadnagy, 2018), because the 
use of influencing techniques are as much present in parent-child relationships 
as they are in cybercrime. In fact, the parental use of instrumental lying (Hey-
man, Luu, & Lee, 2009) is all too common as well as a very familiar pheno-
menon to most people3.  
Furthermore, I contend that the notion of teleological replacement (Hatfield, 
2018: 104) ought to be recast as influencing persons’ will to act, because where 
influencing fails, no purpose replacement can be said to have occurred. This is 
supported by Alexander & Schmidt (1996: 2), who note with respect to the 
original meaning of social engineering that “social engineers have often 
resorted to violent measures to break the will of those whom they wanted to 
change”. Moreover, recasting teleological replacement as influencing persons’ 
will to act gives us (through the notion of influencing) a direct path to analysing 
how the influencing occurs and what it comprises. For instance, within the 
public and political sphere, we find discussions regarding the dissemination of 
propaganda or the use of demagoguery (Roberts-Miller, 2019) as well as 
“nudging”, i.e. the use of behavioural, economic and psychological insights to 
influence the behaviour of policy targets (Moseley, 2020; Schmidt & Engelen, 
2020). Within the private or individual sphere, we find discussions about the 
specific uses of influencing techniques (Cialdini, 2009) that are employed to 
direct people’s behaviour. As my thesis follows the line of current cybersecurity 
discussions of social engineering, the aforementioned difference in the scale of 
influencing is crucial as it also reveals the underlying goals of social engi-
neering practices. 
Hence, the political science treatment of social engineering primarily con-
cerns itself with (perceived) social problems addressed on a larger scale, e.g. 
through public policy (Fein, 2001). The goal of social engineering in the 
cybersecurity domain, however, is mainly focussed on how the behaviour of 
individuals is manipulated through influencing techniques (Hadnagy, 2018). 
Admittedly, easy access to ICTs has allowed the individual instances of social 
engineering to grow into a large-scale problem (PurpleSec, 2021). Even so, this 
larger problem must be understood as the sum total of a significant number of 
isolated individual manifestations of social influencing used for illicit purposes.  
Thus, it is feasible to begin the study of the larger problem of social en-
gineering attacks by understanding individual instances of it. In particular, 
important insight can be provided by understanding how (successful) in-
fluencing is achieved within individual instances of social engineering, i.e. how 
                                                 
3  For in-depth accounts of the role of instrumental lying as it marks the concept of ‘social 
hypocrisy’, see Denery (2015) and Douglass (2020). 
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the use of influencing techniques appears in social engineering attacks. This 
approach is also supported by the universal nature of compliance and the fact 
that no one demographic is more or less vulnerable to the deceptive practices of 
social engineering (Norris, Brookes, & Dowell, 2019). Given that influencing 
occurs through communication, a reasonable point of departure in the analysis 
of crime-as-communication is to focus on the point of convergence that con-
nects perpetrators (of any background and intention) to their targets (of any 
demographic or disposition) – the messages that perpetrators use to try and 
change the behaviour of their targets. Furthermore, assessing techniques of 
social influencing (Cialdini, 2009) as these appear in socially engineered 
messages is also independent of the size and type of the particular audience or 
the background of the senders. 
Hence, understanding technology-mediated crime as concurrently con-
stituting a communicative act means that the successful completion of the crime 
act from the perpetrator’s perspective depends on the efficacy of influencing 
techniques employed in the socially engineered messages. In contrast, and from 
the recipient’s perspective, the ability of detecting instances of social engi-
neering within technology-mediated acts of crime(-as-communication) enables 
the mitigation of risks and the possible prevention of victimisation. 
 
 
2.4 Towards the crime-as-communication approach 
As mentioned in Chapter 2.1, the routine activity approach suggests that crime 
is likely to occur when a likely offender converges, in space and time, with its 
target in the absence of a capable guardian. This basic separation of analytical 
elements of a crime act is broad enough to provide a starting point for the study 
of various types of crime, including technology-mediated crimes. However, as I 
noted in detail in Chapter 2.2 and in Study IV, there are significant problems 
with the guardian element, in particular with respect to technology-mediated 
criminal activity. More specifically, the manner in which people use modern 
ICT devices suggests that if the guardian is to be understood as a third person, 
then guardians are almost always absent from the (attempted) crime act. Never-
theless, where a guardian is to be understood as a role (see Eck & Madensen, 
2015), then a person being targeted in a crime act can concurrently perform as 
their own guardian.  
Understanding that the individual being targeted for a crime can perform the 
role of a guardian (see above, Figure 1), and acknowledging that all mediated 
activity, by definition, is rooted in and dependent on communication, leads us to 
see the perpetrators as senders, targets as recipients and the point of con-
vergence as the messages exchanged. In other words, the previously described 
synthesis makes it possible to translate and place criminal activity, which occurs 
in mediated environments, into a communication-based framework, i.e. the 
crime-as-communication approach.  
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At this juncture, it is important to note certain aspects that form the crime-as-
communication approach: 
• there are criminal acts that do not require interaction from the target for suc-
cessful completion, e.g. robberies (unlawfully taking an object with the use 
of violence). With respect to mediated crimes, we could therefore refer to 
“robbery-type” crimes in which the crime target’s involvement has no signi-
ficant bearing on the outcome of the crime act (see Study I). Non-technical 
robbery-type crimes can include, for instance, giving false testimony (see 
Jõgi, 2012), since the act of lying under specific circumstances is sufficient 
for committing the offence. Technical robbery-type crimes can include, for 
instance, cyber-attacks in which transmissions are targeted at machines 
rather than humans (see e.g. McGuire & Dowling, 2013: 5); 
• there are criminal acts that require interaction from the target, e.g. fraud 
(causing proprietary damage to another person by knowingly causing a 
misconception of existing facts) or extortion (coercion of another person to 
transfer proprietary benefits, among other things, through threatening to 
restrict the liberty of a person). With respect to mediated crimes, we could 
therefore refer to “fraud-type” or “extortion-type” crimes in which the crime 
target’s response to the perpetrator is influenced either through deception or 
coercion (Study I); 
• obviously, not all communication pertains to criminal activities. The disse-
mination of harmful information (see Hansson et al., 2021) comes in many 
forms, e.g. disinformation. While not always criminal under applicable law, 
the spread of harmful information can, and often does, create improved 
conditions for the success of crime-as-communication. Hence, these other 
instances of harmful or misleading information can act as context for actual 
criminal activity. 
With respect to crimes that require interaction from the target/recipient, social 
engineering (see 2.3) is used in an attempt to shape the recipient’s response in a 
way that benefits the sender. This means that the outcome of these types of 
mediated crime acts is determined by, on one hand, how a perpetrator produces 
a meaningful message through encoding (Hall, 1973) and, on the other hand, 
how the recipient meaningfully decodes the message. This is the basic premise 
of crime-as-communication, i.e. criminals communicating with their targets in a 
meaningful way. For instance, it would be difficult if not impossible to commu-
nicate a lottery win to someone, who has no concept of what lotteries are.  
Furthermore, the particular meaning of exchanged messages relies on the 
context in which said messages were exchanged (Rigotti & Rocci, 2006). In 
addition to its interpretive dimension, i.e. helping us understand what was com-
municated to us, context also has a constitutive dimension (Rigotti & Rocci, 
2006). The constitutive dimension of context means that, given a specific con-
text, certain messages are chosen over others for the creation of meaningful 
exchange. Referring back to opportunity theories of crime (see 2.1), context is 
to messages what immediate circumstances are to an act of (‘terrestrial’) crime. 
Put differently, similar to how immediate circumstances (e.g. angry, intoxicated 
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and in a verbal dispute) can contribute to the realisation of a criminal act, the 
context in which messages are received can contribute to the particular way in 
which said messages are understood by the recipient (see Study II, III). For 
instance, a text message that notifies a person of a fine that was imposed on 
them due to a violation of lockdown rules (Salisbury, 2020) can have a parti-
cular meaning within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, but be meaning-
less otherwise (cf Study II, III). 
Nevertheless, meaningful exchanges and feasible contexts are ways of en-
suring that the transmitted content is understood (as close to) as intended (as 
possible). People, by default, assume that communication is truthful, because 
this disposition facilitates interaction in a social world (Levine, 2019). Provided 
that intentional deception is the exception not the rule (Levine, 2019), people 
are also more vulnerable to instances where deceptive practices, such as social 
engineering, are in fact employed. In order for suspicion to arise about certain 
acts of communication, there must be a triggering event, i.e. something in the 
message must constitute ‘diagnostically useful information’ that triggers a per-
son to suspect deception (and, consequently, the potentially criminal nature of 
the communication). Hence, using socially engineered messages in (more or 
less) feasible contexts constitutes the perpetrators’ toolbox in crimes-as-com-
munication where interaction is required from the recipient. In contrast, the 
knowledge and ability to detect deception in socially engineered messages is the 
key to avoid providing the perpetrators a response they seek, e.g. personal infor-
mation, bank information, access to the device etc. Thus, merely understanding 
the manifest meaning of the content in communicated messages is not enough 
to prevent victimisation – some element, i.e. ‘diagnostically useful information’, 
within the message and/or its context must trigger the recipient to suspect 
deception. 
 
 
2.4.1 Research questions 
Following from the aim of my thesis and the theoretical framework provided 
above, my thesis is guided by the following research questions (RQ): 
1. What diagnostically useful information is available to a recipient from the 
content and context of social engineering attacks? (Study I, II, III, IV) 
a. How can conventional crimes defined under criminal law inform the 
communicative aspects of criminal activity in mediated form? (Study I) 
b. Which general communicative approaches appear in the production of 
messages used in social engineering attacks? (Study I, II, III) 
c. What role does impersonation play in social engineering attacks? (Study 
I, II, III) 
d. Which media are used by criminals to perpetrate social engineering 
attacks (Study I, III, IV)? 
e. What topics and themes do criminals rely on in social engineering 
attacks? (Study I, II, III) 
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f. Which specific social-psychological influencing techniques are employed 
in social engineering attacks? (Study III) 
g. What role does social context play in social engineering attacks? (Study 
I, II, III) 
2. How does the crime-as-communication approach contribute to current 
criminological thought on cybercrime? (Entire thesis) 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
In this Chapter, I provide an overview of the methods that guided my research 
in the three empirical studies (Study I, II, III), which motivated the theoretical 
criticism put forward in Study IV and, ultimately, lead to the development of 
the mazephishing framework (Study III) and the concept of crime-as-com-
munication. The overview of the main data collection and data analysis 
methods used in the empirical studies is provided in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1: Overview of the data collection and data analysis methods used in the thesis.  
 
 Data collection Data analysis 
Study I Emails (n=297) received 
in two personal email 
accounts 
Qualitative text analysis (Ezzy, 2002) with 
coding scheme developed on the basis of 
applicable criminal law provisions 
Study II News stories (n=831) 
from international media
Qualitative content analysis (Krippendorff, 
2004) 
Study III News stories (n=563) 
from international media
Qualitative and quantitative content analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2004) 
 
 
Following from the focus on messages as points of mediated converge between 
senders (perpetrators) and recipients (targets), I used qualitative text analysis in 
Study I and content analysis in Study II and III. Although the general ap-
proach is consistent and similar across all three empirical studies, each work 
built on the previous one. As a researcher, I am primarily interested in the story-
telling and persuasion abilities of scammers as these abilities are reflected in the 
messages that ultimately reach recipients. Since there are numerous aspects that 
researchers can focus on within the broader field of susceptibility to social 
engineering attacks (see Nguyen, Jensen, Durcikova, & Wright, 2020: Appen-
dix A), my background in law was a determining factor at the start of Study I. 
Doctrinal legal research has developed its own rules for interpreting social 
phenomena and colleting “data”, i.e. binding normative sources, principles of 
law, case law and authoritative scholarship (see Van Hoecke, 2011). Due to this 
significant difference in its approach to research data, doctrinal legal research is 
essentially bound to produce new opinions instead of new facts. Nevertheless, 
the importance of the nullum crimen sine lege principle (no crime without 
applicable law) cannot be entirely set aside when departing on a study of crime. 
This is why Study I uses data suitable for a systematic analysis of a social 
phenomenon but applies a coding scheme developed on the basis of applicable 
Estonian criminal law, i.e. takes a socio-legal approach (Van Hoecke, 2011). 
Hence, it is possible to trace how my thinking and approach to research deve-
loped from Study I to Study II where I set legal aspects aside in lieu of a move 
towards the disciplines of criminology and communication. In particular, this 
move brought with it a more generic approach to the study of crime as a socially 
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constructed phenomenon (Posick, 2018). Moreover, setting aside specific legal 
aspects and the strict frame of legal interpretation also provided more creative 
freedom in both data collection and its subsequent analysis. This opened the 
opportunity to focus on the content as well as the context of social engineering 
attacks and develop the mazephishing framework (Study III). Thus, the crime-
as-communication approach is the result of the previously described step-by-
step developments from a socio-legal research (Study I) to qualitative content 
analysis (Study II) to a hybrid (qualitative and quantitative) content analysis 
(Study III). 
Below, I provide a more detailed overview of the substantive choices re-
garding data collection and data analysis methods employed in Study I, II and 
III using a study-by-study structure to better reflect the previously described 
developments. 
 
3.1 Study I 
The aim of Study I was to ascertain the prevalence of e-mail based social en-
gineering attacks perpetrated against an individual (in this case, the author of 
this thesis) over a one-month period from mid-August to mid-September in 
2018. Emails used as data (N = 297) were collected from two email accounts of 
the author and the final sample used in the subsequent analysis comprised 
emails (N=42) that were in English and exhibited strong initial indicators of a 
phishing attack. These initial indicators include, for instance, an unknown sender, 
grammatical errors, subject lines with upper-case letters throughout as well as 
ambiguous, generic or overtly out of place topics (Jakobsson, 2007: 3–6). 
Due to its exploratory and socio-legal nature, Study I used qualitative text 
analysis with open coding as the method with one e-mail as the unit of analysis 
(Ezzy, 2002). The chosen qualitative approach allowed me to explore the 
relatively small final sample of emails in more depth. The guiding concept of 
coding in Study I was the influence and impact that message content could 
have on recipients’ will to act, which accounts for the fact that the ultimate goal 
of social engineering attacks is to influence the recipient into action (Khonji, 
Iraqi, & Jones, 2013). 
I developed the coding scheme on the basis of existing phishing literature, 
e.g. the use of ‘urgency cues’ in social engineering attacks (Williams, Hinds, & 
Joinson, 2018), and concepts used in the legal analysis of certain criminal offen-
ces against property (robberies, extortion and fraud) (see RQ 1a). I made use of 
how legal analysis approaches the influencing of a person’s will to act (Sootak, 
2010) for: 
• robberies – a person’s will is broken, i.e. compliance is not expected or 
required from the target; 
• extortion – a person’s will is bent through coercion; and  
• fraud – a person’s will is influenced through the creation of misconceptions, 
i.e. a person makes the decision, but based on misleading information. 
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On one hand, robberies and extortions exhibit a more intense influence on a 
person’s will to act, while this intensity is lesser in cases of fraud. On the other 
hand, robberies do not expect or require interaction from the target for the 
completion of the crime act, while extortion and fraud do. For this reason, I 
completed the four-element scheme by adding an informational-type interaction 
(Study I: 51), which is considered low in intensity and does not expect or 
require specific compliance from the target. 
The notion of specific compliance relates to an understanding of control 
within the interaction that results or can be expected to result from the social 
engineering attack. For instance, the idea of robbery-type communications was 
based on the conventional criminal offence of robbery in which the perpetrator 
overpowers the victim entirely, e.g. knocks a victim unconscious before taking 
their belongings. A hypothetical example from the digital sphere would be an 
instance where, upon opening an e-mail merely for reading, the target’s device 
is overtaken or locked without any further interaction expected or required from 
the victim, e.g. a ransomware attack (Proofpoint, 2019) that does not require the 
recipient to open any attachments. 
Similarly, while there may be implicit notions of compliance embedded in 
the message in informational-type instances, the sender lacks control required 
for specific compliance, i.e. getting the recipient to visit a specific website or 
open a specific e-mail attachment. Thus, if the sender lacks a way for eliciting 
specific compliance, the perpetrator also lacks control over the attack’s out-
come. 
Thus, the expectation for Study I was that the final sample (N=42) would 
present some type of split between extortion- and fraud-type communications. 
While extortion-type and fraud-type differ in terms of intensity on a person’s 
will to act, i.e. use of threats vs use of deception, both require ‘specific comp-
liance’ from the target of the message. 
Finally, it is important to note that although the sample in Study I was 
limited for specific reasons, i.e. data collection only covered a particular time 
period and the sample was not supplemented with emails from sources other 
than the email accounts (compare with Atkins & Huang, 2013), this does not 
negate or exclude the possibility of scaling the research design for represen-
tative samples in the future. However, since legal interpretation, i.e. determining 
the type of offence committed or attempted, is a manual process that requires 
specific knowledge, the manpower required for scaling the design used in 
Study I would likely be extensive. Even so, using a similar basic research 
design in the future would be feasible for gaining insights into the cybercriminal 
activity faced by smaller (or highly particular) populations. Furthermore, basing 
the coding design on actual legal provisions from applicable criminal law also 
allows researchers to compare their study results with available official crime 
statistics, which is not possible with a generic treatment of crime acts. 
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3.2 Study II 
The starting point for Study II was a gap in existing literature, which suggested 
that while the use of salient current events as the interpretive backdrop for 
social engineering attacks is generally recognised in publications and reports of 
the cybersecurity industry (RiskIQ, 2020), the same cannot be asserted for aca-
demic scholarship (Verma, Crane, & Gnawalli, 2018). After noticing an in-
crease in reports of COVID-19-themed social engineering attacks in well-
known specialist newsletters such as The Cyberwire and The Hacker News in 
early 2020, the aim of Study II was to understand the extent to which fraud- 
and extortion-type scam messages appear “in the wild”, i.e. in non-controlled 
conditions, within and as inspired by the context of the COVID-19 pandemic 
(see RQ 1b & 1g). 
The data collection for Study II relied on publicly available information and 
started with an initial sample (N=1928) of results from a Google keyword 
search using the phrases “covid scam”, “covid phishing”, “coronavirus scam” 
and “coronavirus phishing”, while limiting the results to ones appearing in 
English. Making use of Google’s search operators, these four phrase-based 
searches were performed separately for each month from January 2020 to April 
2020. To further facilitate the data collection and initial analysis, I used the 
Linkclump Google Chrome extension, which allows to collect the links of 
search results instead of immediately going through each result. 
Using qualitative content analysis with some elements of quantification 
(Krippendorff, 2004), the initial data were evaluated and separated into cate-
gories of “mainstream media” (e.g. online newspapers and websites of different 
radio and TV news stations) and “specialist media” (e.g. online news platforms 
dedicated to technology and cybercrime reports such as BleepingComputer or 
Tech Xplore).  
Two rounds of exclusions were made from the initial sample. Results that 
only contained video, appeared as posts on social media or were published on 
websites of private companies (e.g. banks or law firms), on the official websites 
of public authorities and different non-profit organisations were excluded from 
the final sample. These initial exclusions were made to ensure consistency in 
data sources, i.e. text-based news stories. Further, by relying on the communica-
tion types developed in Study I (robbery-, informational-, fraud- and extortion-
types), news stories that pertained to hoaxes and misinformation (informational-
type) or purely technical attacks in which the exploitation of human vulnerabi-
lities would be a non-issue (robbery-type) were also excluded (see 4.4.).  
Following exclusions, the (thematic) content analysis was carried out based 
on the final sample of news stories (N=831) as appearing in mainstream media 
(N=618) and specialist media (N=213). To capture the variety of communica-
tion strategies present in the social engineering attacks in the sample, my co-
author and I used single words, phrases as well as sentences and paragraphs as 
units of coding. Most importantly, we discussed the meanings of codes 
developed on the basis of Study I and shared our interpretations throughout the 
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process. The primary guidance related to the gain-based nature of fraud-type 
communications, i.e. scam messages the content of which attempts to deceive 
recipients into action by offering to fulfil certain of their needs, and the loss-
based nature of extortion-type communications, i.e. scam messages that use fear 
appeals and threats of loss to coerce recipients into action. These commu-
nicative strategies were tentatively called “the Good Samaritan” (based on the 
fraud-type) and “Shock and Awe” (based on the extortion-type). 
The Good Samaritan strategy can be expected to see use where perpetrators 
aim to respond to a (sudden) demand, including material or psychological 
desires, of a target with a fictional supply. Thus, the Good Samaritan strategy is 
to be understood as a reward or gain-based approach, i.e. promising the target of 
the social engineering attack something that the target is already seeking or may 
be interested in obtaining. Such needs may include companionship (e.g. Carter, 
2021), money (Carter, 2015) or certain goods, e.g. personal protective equip-
ment during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The Shock and Awe strategy, conversely, emerges from using fear appeals 
and urgency cues to suggest to a target that they may experience some sort of 
loss, e.g. financial or reputational, unless action is taken. Unlike the Good 
Samaritan strategy, which aims to lull the target into an expectation of gain, the 
Shock and Awe approach confronts the target directly with the possibility of a 
penalty or loss (see Williams & Polage, 2019), e.g. by threatening to release 
sensitive materials or shut off electricity unless payment is made. 
 
 
3.3 Study III 
The data sample used in Study II was also employed in Study III. However, 
certain important coding specifications were developed and added, and a further 
layer of quantitative analysis was implemented in Study III as described below. 
For Study III, I made further exclusions from the sample of news stories 
established in Study II (N=831), in particular with respect to excessive repeti-
tions of essentially identical news stories. Hence, the final sample of news 
stories for subsequent content analysis in Study III was N=563. Furthermore, 
since some news stories covered more than one scam, each scam within a news 
story was counted separately, resulting in N=1040 scams. 
Where Study II had a more qualitative emphasis with minimal elements of 
quantification to ascertain the overall presence of the “Good Samaritan” and 
“Shock and Awe” approaches, important specifying coding elements were 
added in Study III. In addition to coding the employed approach to message 
production, the coding scheme used in Study III included: 
• the person of the sender of a scam, including whether international organi-
sations, public authorities or private companies were impersonated (RQ 1c); 
• the theme used in the scam, e.g. health information, provision of goods or 
soliciting donations (RQ 1e); and  
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• the medium used for delivering the social engineering attack, i.e. emails, text 
messages, phone calls, social media messages or posts and websites (RQ 
1d).  
Thus, Study III used a hybrid approach to content analysis, i.e. combining ele-
ments of qualitative and quantitative content analysis. Furthermore, the analysis 
presented in Study III made use of Cialdini’s (2009) six principles of persua-
sion to qualitatively assess the content of previously coded descriptions of 
social engineering attacks (see RQ 1f). These six principles of persuasion pro-
posed by Cialdini (2009) are: 
• authority – people exhibit a tendency to comply with requests from autho-
ritative figures;  
• scarcity – people desire an item more when there is competition for it or its 
availability decreases; 
• liking and similarity – people are more easily persuaded by someone they 
know and like; 
• social proof – people look to others to confirm their decisions; 
• reciprocity – people are inclined to return a favour provided to them; 
• consistency – people aim to be consistent in their actions and keep to their 
commitments; 
From the combination of the coding scheme, parts of which were developed for 
Study II but significantly specified and added to in Study III, and the use of 
Cialdini’s six principles of persuasion, I developed the messages-in-context 
analytical framework of mazephishing. The mazephishing framework looks at 
three elements that characterise a social engineering attack: the context of the 
social engineering attack, e.g. salient social circumstances that have or may 
have an impact on the content of scams, the medium that is used for delivering 
the attack (i.e. the message), e.g. emails, text messages or phone calls, as well as 
the influencing techniques that appear from the content of the scam. 
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3.4 Reflecting on the advantages and limitations of  
the chosen methodology 
Focussing on the content of messages provides certain privileges over other 
methodological choices, but also presents some limitations. Firstly, analysing 
messages rather than interactions or message exchanges between senders and 
recipients takes away the possibility of investigating the development of the 
perpetrator-target relationship over time (see e.g. Carter, 2021). Nevertheless, 
Carter (2015) showed that even scam leaflets delivered by conventional mail 
have the potential to deceive recipients into action. In essence, even a single 
message and the intricacies of its content are sufficient for gaining insight into 
the strategies used by (cyber)criminals.  
Secondly, while focussing on message content and context does not provide 
accounts of the actual reception of such messages, i.e. the accounts are limited 
to the analysis carried out by a researcher, it gives the opportunity to take an in-
depth look into the ways messages differ, for example by topic/theme, context, 
medium used etc. This opportunity is in direct contrast with the limitations of 
most susceptibility studies (see e.g. Nguyen, Jensen, Durcikova, & Wright, 
2020: Appendix A), because checking for susceptibility mostly means using a 
relatively small sample of crafted messages to ascertain recipient reactions. 
Thirdly, and specifically in contrast with the data collection choice made in 
Study II and III, the primary focus in social engineering attacks’ research is on 
phishing emails (Nguyen, Jensen, Durcikova, & Wright, 2020), as these are the 
most plentily available form of data. According to Button & Cross (2017), 
while people are often aware of some types of scams, they can concurrently be 
completely unaware of other types, including the media used for scams. Thus, 
solely focussing on emails (e.g. Study I) only solves part of the puzzle with 
respect to understanding the approaches used in socially engineered messages. 
Due to their availability, emails are a good starting point for larger-scale investi-
gations into message-strategy developments over time (Stojnic, Vatsalan, & 
Arachchilage, 2021), but more information is needed about other media used in 
scams such as phone calls (see e.g. Armstrong, Jones, & Namin, 2021). Hence, 
although Study II and III focus on content and not interactions or reception, 
these works also cover numerous media, which provides an improved starting 
point for future studies into the content of social engineering attacks, including 
as influenced by salient social contexts. 
Finally, the preference of qualitative inquiries over quantitative approaches, 
i.e. with the exception of Study III, stems from two primary reasons of which 
the first relates to the discipline of criminology in general and the other to the 
overall debate regarding the method of content analysis. The study of cyber-
crime is often avoided by criminologists, in some cases due to perceived tech-
nical complexity (Diamond & Bachmann, 2015; Maimon & Louderback, 2019). 
Furthermore, as quantitative approaches loom large over qualitative inquiries 
(Jacques, 2014), the knowledge that is being created lacks intensity for properly 
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understanding the nuances of what goes on at the core of cybercriminal con-
vergence, i.e. in the messages used to commit these crimes.  
This also relates directly to the second concern, i.e. the Berelson-Kracauer 
debate (Schreier, 2014: 171) in which the “manifest content of communication” 
approach (Berelson, 1952: 18, as cited in Schreier, 2014) was contested by 
Kracauer (1952, as cited in Schreier, 2014: 171), who argued that meaning is 
often complex, holistic and context dependent, and “is not necessarily apparent 
at first sight”. Hence, while quantification certainly played an important role in 
Study III, the utility of the approach was enabled by the qualitative basis 
already established in Study I and II. 
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4. FINDINGS 
4.1. Sender identities 
Since every activity, including criminal activity, in technology-mediated (on-
line) environments is rooted in and dependent upon communication, the con-
vergence between a sender (the supposed criminal actor) and the recipient (the 
potential victim) manifests as an exchange of messages. In modern technology-
enabled communications, such as e-mails and text messages, the recipients’ 
attention is first drawn to some identifying information about the sender, e.g. 
their name. However, it is relatively easy to “spoof” the sender’s identity in 
technology-mediated communications (Study I), i.e. make it seem like the in-
coming communication is from someone that has actually nothing to do with 
the message (see RQ 1c).  
The emails analysed in Study I showed that it is common for perpetrators of 
social engineering attacks to use fake names, including internationally well-
known company names such as JP Morgan Chase (Study I). Thus, as a com-
mon form of deception, “spoofing” allows senders to take on (perceived) iden-
tities that may mean something or seem authoritative to recipients. For instance, 
in the 1040 scams analysed in Study III, a total of 1019 (98%) used faked 
sender information. Due to its easy application, and the fact that people are 
inclined to comply with requests from authorities (Cialdini, 2009), imperso-
nating specific entities or persons allows perpetrators the opportunity to try and 
deceive recipients with the added benefit of appearing as a source of authority. 
Study I showed that such fake sources can include banks and government 
entities, while Study II and III further added international organisations (the 
World Health Organisation), healthcare institutions (Center for Disease Cont-
rol), tax authorities (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs), local utilities 
companies and charitable organisations. 
Although Study I, II and III showed that perpetrators often use well-known 
fake identities for added perceived credibility, it is not always a necessary ele-
ment of socially engineered messages. For example, the criminals also use 
entirely made-up names and even leave the sender’s identity anonymous (Study 
I: 56–58). The name “Iris J. Stobbs” was provided in a scam suggesting the 
availability of millions of inherited dollars and the sender was “anonymous” in 
an email threatening to release sensitive materials featuring the recipient. Thus, 
senders’ so-called choice of identity seems to follow from the topic and content 
of the message: well-known “spoofed” identity for messages relating to some 
potentially relevant aspect in a recipient’s daily life (banks, utilities companies, 
healthcare institutions etc.), made-up names for completely unexpected com-
munications (Study I: 55), or even seemingly anonymous senders where this 
ambiguity serves a purpose, e.g. creates an aura of mystery around the 
criminal’s identity. 
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4.2 Hot topics and social context 
Beyond the identity of senders, the recipient can also determine the general 
topic of the message. For instance, this may be available from the subject line of 
an email (Study I), but primarily comes from the content of the message itself 
(Study I, II, III), because not every medium provides the opportunity of giving 
a “title” to the message, e.g. phone calls.  
The research design of Study I meant that messages forming the sample 
were collected “as is” (Study I: 50), i.e. no topic related categorisation or filte-
ring was applied to data collection. This provided a sample of emails anyone 
could receive in the course of their normal daily lives, which was important for 
the purposes of capturing the presence or absence of different kinds of message 
topics. Therefore, the messages were from “rich widows” (Study I: 57–58), 
who have fallen ill and want to give away their inherited wealth, as well as so-
called expert “hackers” attempting to extort the recipient by threatening to 
release sensitive materials. The first of these is a typical example of an advance-
fee fraud where a recipient is offered a significant amount of money in return 
for a small (monetary) favour, e.g. paying the transfer fee of the larger sum4. 
The second example is that of “sextortion” (sex and extortion), which is used to 
coerce recipients into paying what the sender demands (Study I: 56–57).  
These generic scam topics often appear in waves, i.e. as fraudulent cam-
paigns where identical or substantively similar messages are sent out in short 
succession. For instance, the sample of Study I included three almost identical 
sextortion messages (Study I: 56). As with their chosen “identities”, scammers 
are also free to choose the topics around which scam messages are constructed. 
While these topics are often generic for the purposes of capturing as wide an 
audience as possible under normal social circumstances (Study I), certain 
events or phenomena in society prompt perpetrators to choose particular topics 
and themes (Study II, III) (see RQ 1e).  
In Study II and III, I therefore focussed entirely on scams that were spurred 
on by the social salience of the COVID-19 pandemic. To study the way in 
which important social circumstances, i.e. social context, impacts the topics and 
content of scam messages (see RQ 1g), I created the mazephishing framework. 
The name mazephishing was inspired by an old fishing technique called ‘almad-
raba’ (Arabic for ‘a place to smite’), which involves setting up elaborate under-
water mazes of nets to catch tunas during their migratory journeys through the 
Strait of Gibraltar. Thus, the catch depends on (1) proper timing, i.e. knowing 
why fish are on the move in large quantities at certain times, (2) place, i.e. 
interrupting the tunas’ movement at a location and in a manner suitable for the 
fishermen, and (3) trap-setting technique (Study III). Hence, the first element 
                                                 
4  These scams are also referred to as “Nigerian 419 scams” or 419 scams and the reference 
to 419 comes from the fact that section 419 of the Nigerian Criminal Code is for the offence 
of fraud (Chiluwa, 2019). Brody, Kern, & Ogunade (2020) provide an in-depth history of the 
development of 419 scams. 
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of the mazephishing framework analyses the social timing of technology-
mediated crime. 
Study II and III showed that the COVID-19 health crisis provided scam-
mers with ample ideas on how to exploit people, who were forced to switch to 
remote work and relied heavily on digital communications. For instance, in the 
early months of the pandemic, scammers preferred sending out fraudulent 
messages claiming to provide important health information, which seemingly 
came from local welfare agencies (Study II), the World Health Organisation or 
the Center for Disease Control (Study III). As the social circumstances deve-
loped, other topics such as financial relief (e.g. government aid or supermarket 
coupons), offers for difficult-to-obtain personal protective equipment (e.g. 
masks) and even cures and vaccines were added as topics (Study II, III). Based 
on the themes and topics employed in scams across the first four months of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, Study III (see Study III: Table 3) clearly showed that 
criminals stay abreast of actual social developments and adjust scam content 
accordingly.  
Thus, under normal circumstances, e.g. in the absence of a socially important 
event or phenomenon, the topics used by criminals in social engineering attacks 
are often generic to capture the attention of the widest audience possible (Study 
I). However, when presented with a relevant opportunity, e.g. a sudden change 
in social circumstances such as the COVID-19 pandemic, at least some crimi-
nals make efforts to adjust the content of the scams they use to deceive and 
victimise recipients (Study II, III). Here, simple logic suggests that salient 
social circumstances offer scammers some advantages in comparison with 
normal circumstances, because making the effort of adjusting scam content 
would be meaningless otherwise, i.e. if the expected “catch” would be of a 
similar size regardless of circumstances. 
 
 
4.3 General communicative approaches used in  
scam message production 
The aim of social engineering attacks is to guide message recipients towards 
specific action, e.g. clicking on a link, opening email attachments, making pay-
ments to the sender (Study I, III) as well as providing the sender with personal 
or financial information (Study I). Therefore, any chosen identities or topics are 
tools for framing the content found in the body of the message.  
In Study I, for example, a made-up identity was used to suggest that the 
sender’s health is failing, which made them want to transfer large sums of 
money into the custody of the recipient for charitable purposes. Given that 
Study II and III focussed specifically on scams circulated during the COVID-
19 pandemic, comparable examples included providing recipients with free 
access to Netflix, supermarket coupons and vouchers and early access to finan-
cial relief (Study II, III). The general connection between the aforementioned 
examples is that the content of the message is created to persuade the recipient 
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into thinking that they will be gaining something from following the sender’s 
instructions. In Study I, such messages were categorised as fraud-type commu-
nications, since the offence of fraud relies on the creation of a misconception 
for the purposes of receiving proprietary gain (Study I: 51; see RQ 1a). In 
Study II, this idea was further developed into the “Good Samaritan” general 
communicative strategy, i.e. an approach to scam message production in which 
the overall deception is based on offering to fulfil some need of the recipient 
(see RQ 1b). 
In contrast to the gain-based approach to scam message production, perpetra-
tors also have the choice of threats and coercion, i.e. taking a fear appeal or 
loss-based approach in their messages. For instance, this includes threatening to 
release sensitive materials (Study I) or to infect the family members of the 
recipient with the COVID-19 virus (Study III) unless payment is made. In 
Study I, such messages were categorised as extortion-type messages, because 
the offence of extortion relies on threatening the subject with certain action un-
less a specific counteraction is performed (Study I: 51; see also RQ 1a). In 
Study II, this idea was further developed into the “Shock and Awe” general 
communicative strategy, i.e. an approach to scam message production in which 
the overall deception is based on threatening the recipient with the loss of 
something (e.g. reputation or health) (see RQ 1b). Furthermore, Study II also 
showed that perpetrators threatened recipients with shutting off their electricity 
connection unless payment was made and also sent bogus fine notifications, 
which suggested that the recipient had violated COVID-19 pandemic lockdown 
rules (Study II).  
Study III showed that 86.5% of the scam messages (N = 900) employed the 
“Good Samaritan” communicative strategy and 13.5% (N = 140) messages used 
the “Shock and Awe” communicative strategy (Study III: Table 2). Based on 
these findings, perpetrators preferred to lure recipients with gains rather than 
threaten them with potential losses during the first four months of the COVID-
19 pandemic. 
 
 
4.4 A variety of media for “setting the traps” 
The second element in the mazephishing framework (Study III) concerns the 
“place” where the perpetrators attempt to carry out the scams. In technology-
mediated environments, the “place” refers to the medium in which the fraudu-
lent communication occurs (Study III). Given the easy and (near-)immediate 
direct access to recipients that technology-mediated communications provide 
(Study IV), people come into contact with criminals often (Study I) and with-
out a feasible possibility of intervention from third persons (Study IV). 
While Study I provided an in-depth view on how criminals use the medium 
of email to circulate different scams, Study III used a broader approach by ana-
lysing scams (N=1040) circulated via emails (53.5%), text messages (12.6%), 
phone calls (13.6%), social media posts and messages (3.1%) as well as 
39 
fraudulent websites (11.3%), including some scams for which a medium was 
not specified (5.9%) (Study III: Table 5; see RQ 1d). This variety of media 
used by perpetrators to circulate scam messages further stresses the importance 
of interpreting message content, in particular due to the differing affordances of 
the aforementioned media. For instance, where emails have headers (i.e. sender 
information) and subject lines (i.e. potential information about message topic), 
phone calls or text messages from unknown numbers cannot be assessed in a 
similar manner. Therefore, the content of messages is a more robust source for 
so-called diagnostically useful information (Levine, 2019), i.e. information 
which should trigger the recipient to suspect deception. 
Following from the above, Study III further established that along with the 
use of a variety of chosen identities, themes and topics, communication media 
and general (gain- or loss-based) approaches to message production, the em-
ployment of specific social-psychological influencing techniques (Cialdini, 
2009) was also detected from the analysed scam messages (see RQ 1f). These 
so-called “trap-setting” techniques form the third element of the mazephishing 
framework (Study III).  
Study III provided empirical support with respect to all six principles of 
persuasion as suggested by Cialdini (2009). For instance, the principle of autho-
rity was present in messages where perpetrators impersonated healthcare institu-
tions when contacting recipients under the pretence of providing COVID-19-
related health information (see also 4.1). Furthermore, the principle of scarcity 
was employed in offers of difficult-to-obtain personal protective equipment, but 
also in offers of non-existent cures and vaccines. The principle of reciprocity 
was employed in various solicitations of donations for bogus charities to help 
relieve the financial strain from COVID-19. The principle of liking was 
employed by a doctor, who was arrested for selling “COVID-19 Treatment 
Packs”, which included hydroxychloroquine, i.e. the anti-malaria drug, which 
was endorsed by then President Donald Trump but was unproven in the 
treatment of COVID-19. The same example also made use of the principle of 
social proof, since Donald Trump was very vocal about his support for the drug 
and could, therefore, influence his supporters to try the drug for themselves.  
The principle of consistency and commitment was clearly present in utilities 
scams (paying electricity bills on time), fake fine notifications (law abiding 
citizens admit fault and pay their fines) as well as bogus messages notifying 
people that they had come into contact with someone infected with COVID-19 
(assuming that the notified people find it necessary to provide further infor-
mation after receiving the message) (Study III). Since the latter two examples 
derive their significance directly from the circumstances of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, these provided strong support for all three elements of the mazephishing 
framework (i.e. the elements of social context, medium of choice and the 
presence of influencing techniques meant for creating deception) (Study III). 
Furthermore, the utilities scam related to electricity bills also went through a 
type of transformation during the COVID-19 pandemic. My analysis of media 
texts suggests that the scam was changed from a “Shock and Awe” message 
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type that employs the principles of authority and consistency to threaten people 
with shutting off electricity unless payment is made into a “Good Samaritan” 
message type that employs the liking principle to offer people discounts on 
outstanding utilities bills (Study II, III). It is probable that the aforementioned 
change was prompted by local regulations that prohibited shutting off essential 
utilities in emergency situations (WHSV, 2020; Study III). This further shows 
that not only do scammers stay abreast of relevant social circumstances, but also 
fluently reflect such changes in the scam messages they produce and circulate. 
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5. DISCUSSION 
I began my thesis from the premise that any and all activity in technology-
mediated environments is rooted in and dependent upon communication. Some 
of this activity – certain information exchanges – amounts to criminal activity, 
i.e. cybercrime.  
As I argue in Study IV, the nature of technology-mediated communication 
makes it easy to gain direct and (near-)immediate access to targets, i.e. access 
without feasible immediate intervention from third persons (Study IV), which 
means that the protective role of third persons is severely diminished in the mo-
ment of mediated convergence. Once third persons are effectively (and logi-
cally) removed from the convergence of a perpetrator and their target in 
technology-mediated circumstances, we are left with a crime act that is concur-
rently a communicative act between the perpetrator and the target. In effect, per-
petrators become senders, targets become recipients, and the convergence 
between the two manifests as an exchange of messages through mediated points 
of convergence. Senders transmit (push) messages/content to mediated points of 
convergence, recipients can be ‘notified’ of incoming communications, and 
receive (pull) the message/content for interpretation (Figure 2). These basic 
elements form the core of the crime-as-communication approach. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Model illustrating the crime-as-communication approach. 
 
 
Thus, a significant contribution of the crime-as-communication approach comes 
from the way the process of crime commission is understood and analysed (see 
RQ 2). Emphasis on senders, recipients, messages and mediated points of 
convergence is an approach derived from properly answering the question 
“What is said when we say X?” where X stands for any common description of 
activities in technology mediated environments, e.g. “using online banking”, 
“using online dating sites”, “using social media” etc. However, descriptions of 
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“online activities” and their role in studies of cybercrime victimisation (e.g. 
Ngo, Piquero, LaPrade, & Duong, 2020) often only amount to what I consider 
to be “lazy signifiers”. Lazy signifiers provide people with a rough idea of what 
is being signified and can be used for smoother (and more concise) 
communication on account of shared fields of experience (see Schramm, 1954 
as cited in West & Turner, 2019: 11) between sender and recipient, which allow 
for meaningful exchanges without going into excruciating detail. This approach, 
however, is insufficient for the analysis of cybercrime and needs more speci-
ficity (see Figure 2). 
For example, a common finding in current cybercrime-related criminological 
research is that people are at a greater risk of becoming a victim of cybercrime 
the more time they spend online (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; see also Ngo, Piquero, 
LaPrade, & Duong, 2020: 433–434). On one hand, this explanation is entirely 
logical, because if cybercrime is crime perpetrated with the use of connected 
ICT devices, then actively using such devices is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of victimisation. On the other hand, this explanation is highly proble-
matic, because a person can “be online” for most of the day on most days of the 
year (e.g. IT experts or ‘hackers’) and not become a victim, while a person 
could also “be online” for 10 minutes only once a month to access their bank 
account and become a victim of bank fraud. Clearly, this level of explanation 
provides no real insights about the ‘risk’ in the supposed risk of becoming a 
victim. Thus, it is important to notice how little information is conveyed by the 
phrase “spending time online” if we do not also ask and properly answer the 
question “What is said when we say ‘spending time online’?”. 
Therefore, the next level of specificity would be to deconstruct “spending 
time online” into different categories of activity (i.e. “online activities”) such as 
“using online banking”, “using social media”, “using online dating sites” (see 
e.g. Ngo, Piquero, LaPrade, & Duong, 2020). However, these signifiers are still 
too opaque to provide useful insights into why a person becomes a victim of an 
act of cybercrime. 
Hence, a further level of specificity is required, i.e. the action-as-commu-
nication level. For example, “using online banking” is, to put it simply, a series 
of requests for certain information made to, and responses received from, speci-
fic servers through the use of one’s networked device. In these information 
exchanges, the user’s interpretations of the received information/content form 
the basis for deciding on the next action (in the interaction). In other words, 
understanding that “using online banking” is, in fact, a series of communicative 
acts begins to reveal how this communication process can be initiated, mi-
micked and exploited by perpetrators for illicit gains, i.e. crime-as-commu-
nication is a subcategory of action-as-communication. Common examples in-
clude perpetrators impersonating bank personnel to obtain sensitive information 
(Flinders, 2020) or creating bogus look-alikes of a bank’s website to deceive a 
user into inserting their authentication information (Swinhoe, 2020). Thus, the 
ways in which people become victims of cybercrime cannot be adequately 
explained on the level of “spending time online” or “using online banking” and 
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“using online dating sites”, but can be explained, for instance, by analysing how 
people interpret or may interpret incoming communications and the actions 
such interpretations lead to (Figure 3), including in longer interactions (see e.g. 
Carter, 2021). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Action-as-communication leading to action(-as-communication). 
 
 
By making explicit the communication processes that constitute cybercriminal 
activity, including crime(-as-communication) acts that do not directly target 
human recipients (see also 4.4 and 5.1), the crime-as-communication approach 
provides an original contribution to understanding technology-mediated crime 
specifically, and action in technology-mediated environments more broadly. 
The latter primarily concerns instances where the use of lazy signifiers, i.e. con-
sidering and presenting as a meaningful whole something that is better under-
stood as its constitutive elements, hinders rather than contributes to the thinking 
and research process. 
 
 
5.1 Crime-as-communication 
As noted above (see also 4.4; RQ 2), not all communication-based criminal 
activity requires interaction from a human target. For instance, a recipient does 
not have to further interact with criminal threats in order for the sender’s com-
municative act to also constitute an act of crime. Furthermore, purely technical 
attacks (see e.g. McGuire & Dowling, 2013: 5) exploit vulnerabilities in 
machines without the need of involving a human target. In fact, the reason why 
attacks targeting the human element have increased in importance starting from 
the 2000s (Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, & Mencer, 2007) is the respective 
progress in technological barriers to purely technical attacks. Put differently, it 
is often easier for criminal actors to ‘hack humans’ (see Hadnagy, 2018) in a 
social engineering attack than it is to overcome complex technological security 
measures. Regardless of the target in question – be it machine or human – I 
argue that it is impossible to deny that cybercriminal activity is rooted in and 
dependent upon communication. 
The above further raises the question whether a distinction between cyber-
dependent and cyber-enabled crimes (McGuire & Dowling, 2013), i.e. crimes 
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that are not possible without connected ICT devices (technical attacks) and 
crimes that are further enabled by connected ICT devices (e.g. fraud), is wholly 
necessary. For instance, it is possible to ask whether criminal threats levied via 
phone call, text message or email are, at their core, somehow qualitatively diffe-
rent from threats spoken face-to-face (see also Henry & Powell, 2014; Button & 
Cross, 2017). It becomes evident that for crimes, which can be wholly or partly 
perpetrated through communication, relevant communicative aspects must 
become the primary instances of analysis. 
Furthermore, under the crime-as-communication approach, the only actual 
difference between the previously described offence categories (cyber-enabled 
or cyber-dependent) is whether the interpreter of a transmission or message at 
any given point in the commission of a crime is a who (a person reading and 
interpreting a message) or a what (a machine resolving input) (Figure 4). The 
interpreter distinction in the communication process also influences the quality 
of the transmitted content. For example, it would be an unlikely choice for 
perpetrators to call an elderly person, proceed to read out a series of commands 
used in the Python programming language, and expect the call recipient’s bank 
information in return. Similarly, submitting to a machine a lottery notification 
composed in broken English is unlikely to “persuade” the machine into further 
action. In either instance, however, the prerequisite for the possibility of a cri-
minal offence under the crime-as-communication approach is an open channel 
between the sender and recipient, i.e. if a connection cannot be established, a 
crime(-as-communication) act cannot be completed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The difference between transmitting to humans and transmitting to machines: 
S (sender), M (message/mediated point of convergence) and R (recipient). 
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Hence, the success of the cybercriminal act from the perpetrators’ perspective 
depends on the information interpreters that get (or do not get) in the way of 
crime acts based wholly or partly on communication. In crime acts targeting 
machines, this “interpretation” comes down to rule-based resolution of 
transmitted input. For instance, firewalls can be used to block certain incoming 
connections and running anti-virus software can detect known malicious code 
(CISA, 2019). 
However, where a criminal offence requires action from a human recipient, 
such as in social engineering attacks, the success or failure of a crime attempt 
comes down to how the recipient interprets, understands and (potentially) acts 
on the basis of the received communication. Any individual characteristics of 
recipients, e.g. age, gender or education, are therefore relevant only insofar as 
these influence how recipients interpret incoming communications, both in 
terms of meaning (Hall, 1973) and legitimacy (Levine, 2019) (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Recipients interpret received communications both in terms of meaning and 
legitimacy to decide on subsequent action. 
 
 
An important quality of interpretations is their dynamic nature with respect to a 
single individual under different circumstances and with respect to different 
people experiencing the same circumstances. People may interpret messages 
differently depending on their personal circumstances (Lichtenberg, Stickley, & 
Paulson, 2013) and the social context in which the message is received (Rigotti 
& Rocci, 2006; Study III). This notion is in line with the dynamic under-
standing of vulnerability (see e.g. Kuran et al., 2020). For instance, while cul-
tural and political structures, as well as historical forces, play a role in shaping 
societal vulnerability, it is important to recognise that groups (and, thus, indi-
viduals) are vulnerable in some and resilient in other contexts (Kuran et al., 
2020) and that conditions of vulnerability are subject to change (Tierney, 2019 
as cited in Kuran et al., 2020). For social engineering attacks, this means that 
vulnerability can be construed as the reason or reasons why some people with 
certain (combinations of) characteristics may, in some contexts or under certain 
circumstances, interpret as legitimate a communicated message that is fraudu-
lent. 
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According to Levine (2019), if nothing in what is communicated triggers the 
recipient to suspect deception, interpreting the received message as truthful 
(legitimate) is people’s default setting. Therefore, knowledge of diagnostically 
useful information relevant in instances of crime-as-communication requiring 
recipient interaction contributes to how recipients perform the interpretation 
process, i.e. how a recipient arrives at an interpretation of an incoming mes-
sage’s legitimacy (or lack thereof). As exemplified in Study I, II and III, a 
recipient may have to decide whether the World Health Organization actually 
sent them an email with an attachment containing health information, whether a 
sender really has obtained sensitive images depicting the recipient as well as 
whether the electricity will actually be shut off due to supposedly unpaid 
utilities bills etc. Elaborating on the information available to recipients from the 
messages and social context of social engineering attacks is therefore essential 
for preventing successful social engineering attacks. Such information must be 
general and robust enough to allow application in and across different com-
munication media, message topics and social contexts (Study I, II, III). More 
importantly, this information ought to be easily understandable even without 
expert knowledge about cybercrime, i.e. to avoid overwhelming people with 
excessive details (Button & Cross, 2017).  
Hence, raw input for interpretations comes from the observable choices that 
perpetrators make in producing and transmitting crime(-as-communication) 
messages and the relevant diagnostically useful information can, therefore, be 
obtained by explaining the function of such choices with respect to the inter-
pretation process. 
 
 
5.2 Choosing identities and choosing contexts 
Elements relating to a sender’s identity are the first items of information avail-
able to recipients, e.g. senders’ email addresses, phone numbers and names. 
Study I showed that under normal circumstances, perpetrators choose to imper-
sonate well-known companies or, alternatively, use made-up names or the 
mystique of anonymity. In combination with the body text of a message, all 
three of the aforementioned general choices of identity can be viewed as 
attempts at facilitating source credibility and authority (see e.g. Cialdini, 2009). 
The identity of the ailing widow, who offers up millions of dollars, is in line 
with previous research into perpetrator communications in which senders use 
up-front disclosure of personal information to establish a relationship with the 
recipient (see Carter, 2021). The same is evident from the threatening hacker 
message (Study I), because choosing the identity of an “anonymous hacker” 
means that the sender must disclose more information about their actions in the 
body of the message.  
Conversely, impersonating a well-known brand or company lessens the 
explanatory workload required from the perpetrators. In other words, part of the 
persuasion is pre-established by the reputation of the company and/or brand, 
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e.g. Amazon, PayPal or Facebook. This also means that message context is not 
created within the message itself (e.g. the widow’s case), but the message is 
fitted to a pre-existing context. The latter was also clearly present in the fin-
dings of Study II and III, which showed a variety of ways that criminals ex-
ploited the salience of the COVID-19 pandemic when producing fraudulent 
messages. Furthermore, both the interpretive and constitutive dimensions of 
context (Rigotti & Rocci, 2006) were clearly present in scam messages relating 
to the COVID-19 pandemic (Study II, III). Common scam plots such as bogus 
offers for supermarket coupons took on a different meaning during the COVID-
19 pandemic, as people lost jobs and suffered financially (Study III). In cont-
rast, the pandemic context also allowed to circulate and gave credibility to mes-
sages that would not make much sense outside the COVID-19 context, e.g. noti-
fications of fines imposed due to violations of lockdown rules (Study II, III). 
Thus, the importance of message context cannot be underestimated. Com-
bining the already established element of impersonation (Button & Cross, 2017) 
with message context provides new insights into the ways in which the content 
of fraudulent messages is framed (Figure 6). Where salient events or well-
known company names are absent, scammers must rely more heavily on story-
telling and disclosure of (bogus) information related to their made-up identity. 
Put differently, the scammers need to establish the chosen identity and storyline 
before they can effectively start making requests for action from the recipient, 
i.e. arrive at the core purpose of social engineering attacks. Hence, the exploi-
tation of salient social contexts not only decreases criminals’ workload, but is 
also likely to improve the meaningfulness of their communication as the social 
circumstances are “lived” by the sender and recipient alike (Study III). 
 
 
Figure 6. Sender’s choice of identity-in-context for the purpose of framing the message 
and as an attempt to increase perceived legitimacy. 
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5.3 Persuasion or coercion? 
The results of Study III showed that only 13.5% of scam messages (n= 140) 
used the coercive “Shock and Awe” approach to message production. To an 
extent, this finding is at odds with previous research, which has shown that, in 
comparison with the possibility of gain, people are more strongly influenced by 
the possibility of loss (Williams & Polage, 2019). However, newer research into 
phishing email detection has shown that people are more likely to dismiss 
threatening emails as not legitimate (McAlaney & Hills, 2020). In part, this can 
also explain why 86.5% (n= 900) scam messages used the gain-based “Good 
Samaritan” approach to message production. Since the ultimate goal of social 
engineering attacks is to get the recipient to perform actions that benefit the 
sender (Khonji, Iraqi, & Jones, 2013), early dismissal of the message due to 
lack of perceived legitimacy is opposite to what perpetrators are seeking from 
such communications (Figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Sender’s choice of message production strategy was influenced by the salient 
social context. 
 
 
Furthermore, the social circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic also pro-
vided scammers with more “legitimate” opportunities for offering relief rather 
than threatening loss. Scarcity of clear and credible information about the virus 
in the early weeks of the pandemic, subsequent shortages of personal protective 
equipment, and highly anticipated news of effective cures or even a vaccine all 
lent themselves as possible angles for a gain-based approach to producing 
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fraudulent messages (Study II). While there were opportunities for a loss-based 
“Shock and Awe” approach, e.g. bogus fines and threats to infect the recipient’s 
family members, these formed an obvious minority among the circulated scams 
(Study III). 
Hence, scams that use salient social circumstances as context also reflect the 
specific needs that such social circumstances create or amplify – be it the need 
for information (health information), goods (groceries and essentials) or ser-
vices (support services, healthcare). This includes whether criminals opt for a 
more persuasive or coercive approach in their general message production pro-
cess. While previous research has shown that disaster situations, i.e. the social 
context of a hurricane, did entail adapted scam content during and after the 
event (Verma, Crane, & Gnawalli, 2018), the question remains as to what exact-
ly determines the salience threshold for adapted scam message production.  
Although Williams & Polage (2019) attempted to use the notion of a salient 
event in an experimental setting, the results were insignificant regarding the 
persuasiveness of the associated scam messages. As I also argued in Study III, 
this lack of significance could be because the social circumstances were not 
“lived” by the study participants. Thus, while an exact salience threshold is 
difficult to determine, the immediacy of important events or circumstances is 
significant for their persuasive use as social context in social engineering 
attacks (Verma, Crane, & Gnawalli, 2018; Steinmetz, Pimentel, & Roe, 2021; 
Study II, III). Still, what salient social circumstances add in terms of meaning-
fulness also take away from the longevity of such (thematically consistent) 
scams, i.e. when the social circumstances change or cease, the adapted scams 
lose their relevance and persuasive appeal. 
Hence, I argue that the scam messages analysed in Study I, i.e. fraudulent 
messages not evidently based on specific social circumstances or an important 
event, are more resilient and thus likely to enjoy longer circulation. This means 
that specific social circumstances, which influence the content of scams, must 
be considered in addition to the more general (and robust) diagnostically useful 
information when detecting deception. 
 
 
5.4 Generalised diagnostically useful information 
The key piece of diagnostically useful information available to recipients of 
social engineering attack messages is the presence of a request for action (Step 
2 in Figure 8). Requests for action were present in all messages analysed in 
Study I, II and III. On one hand, the notion of requests for action as diag-
nostically useful information seems like a reiteration of the definition of social 
engineering attacks, i.e. the use of socially engineered messages the aim of 
which is to persuade the recipient to perform some action that benefits the sender 
(Khonji, Iraqi, & Jones, 2013). On the other hand, Study I, II and III showed 
how varied the types of requests found in social engineering attacks can be, e.g. 
ranging from widows offering millions of dollars to someone threatening to 
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infect the recipient’s family members with a virus. While the finding of a 
request for action was universal across the empirical studies I, II, III covered in 
my thesis, this finding needs to also be “translated” into an actionable and easy-
to-understand piece of information that can aid recipients in detecting potential 
deception moving forward.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. 3-step process that leads to verification of message legitimacy from another source 
without using the original (potentially corrupt) channel from which the message was received. 
 
 
Thus, it is important to note that not all requests for action are explicit, e.g. di-
rectly ordering the recipient to make payments or clearly pointing out that the 
recipient should provide their bank details in a reply. Implicit requests for 
action also form an important category, in particular where the perpetrators 
only provide the recipient with a brief storyline or very little information, e.g. 
the case of bogus fines for violating lockdown rules (see Study II, III). Instan-
ces where the recipient is provided information, but not a clear directive, and a 
pathway to further action, e.g. a link in a text message or an attachment in an 
email, combine into implicit requests for action that must be understood similar 
to explicit requests. 
The second piece of diagnostically useful information comes in the form 
understanding the variety of media or channels available to perpetrators for use 
in social engineering attacks. Study III showed that criminals use all major 
means for technology-mediated communication, i.e. emails, text messages, 
phone calls, social media posts and messages as well as websites, to perpetrate 
their attacks. Hence, recognising the importance of open channels between the 
perpetrator (sender) and target (recipient) must be, in the first instance, broader 
than merely focussing on one attack vector, e.g. phishing emails. This approach 
is particularly relevant due to the easy and (near-)immediate access that per-
petrators currently have to recipients (Study IV). Furthermore, Button & Cross 
(2017) have emphasised that cybercrime prevention and awareness campaigns 
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often confuse the target audience with excessive details about particular scams. 
Thus, as a practical directive, acknowledging the general importance of an open 
channel ought to come before focussing on specific channels and detailed scams 
perpetrated via such channels. 
Additionally, the variety of media available to perpetrators for carrying out 
attacks as well as the need to verify suspicions of deception (Levine, 2019) lead 
to the idea of a corrupt original channel. For instance, in the case of the bogus 
COVID-19 fines, the initial socially engineered message came via text message 
(Study III). The verification process should therefore begin by choosing not to 
interact with the suspicious message in the original (presumably corrupt) chan-
nel, i.e. by responding to the phone number or email address from which the 
suspicious message was received. Secondly, the verification process ought to 
include checking the contents of the received message using another channel. It 
is important to note that the medium can remain the same, e.g. after receiving 
and hanging up a suspicious phone call, the recipient makes another call to 
legitimate source to verify the information received in the initial call.  
The idea of the corrupt original channel therefore relates to avoiding (un-
necessary) interaction with suspected scammers in the channel of the perpet-
rators’ choosing (Study III, IV), which involves the medium and other aspects 
of message delivery such as the identity chosen by the criminal and thus as-
sociated with the original channel. However, in cases where the recipient sus-
pects that a previously established channel, e.g. an email address through which 
a business partner communicates (Study I), has become corrupted, then the 
verification process must rely on a different medium. Hence, the verification 
process should involve a different source of information where the medium 
used for verification remains the same, and a different medium where the verifi-
cation relates to whether a source would actually send the message received in 
another channel. 
Furthermore, as I already mentioned above (see 4.3) and argued in Study 
IV, the protective role of third persons is only secondary in the verification 
process. In other words, where the initial recipient 1) does not suspect deception 
in the received message and 2) does not attempt to verify the legitimacy of the 
message, third persons are unlikely to even become involved in the verification 
process. That is because third persons are unlikely to have immediate and direct 
access to the same channel through which the recipient was contacted. Thus, the 
detection of deception resides, in the first instance, with the initial recipient, 
while external sources, including third persons, become relevant only in the 
course of the subsequent verification process. 
Therefore, it is imperative for recipients to know that the typical scam mes-
sage primarily relies on either a gain-based or a loss-based approach to pro-
ducing message content (Study II, III). Hence, the third piece of diagnostically 
useful information relates specifically to the content of social engineering 
attacks, i.e. whether the request for action connects to 1) promised gains or 2) 
threatened losses. Alsharnouby, Alaca, & Chiasson (2015) found that people 
pay more attention to the content of the message rather than its technical details. 
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Furthermore, recent research into phishing detection that used eye-tracking 
technology, i.e. to ascertain which parts of the email recipients read first, sug-
gests that recipients look for threatening content and urgency cues before 
aspects such as misspellings (McAlaney & Hill, 2020). Thus, focussing on 
content – i.e. “what is said” (Levine, 2019) – is crucial if we consider that other 
media, e.g. phone calls, used by perpetrators to carry out social engineering 
attacks do not necessarily offer the same level of technical detail for scrutiny by 
the recipients. 
With respect to the amount of content available for scrutiny, it is important 
to note that the scams analysed in Study I, II and III were brief in nature, i.e. 
the (explicit or implicit) request for action was revealed in the first message, 
which is not always the case. For instance, in longer-running romance scams 
(Carter, 2021), the perpetrator first establishes contact with the recipient, builds 
trust over time and only then, at some point, levies the illicit request for action.  
In a way, such longer-running scams are an advanced version of the scams 
analysed in Study I where contact was made by an initially unknown person 
and the request for action was presented promptly. The more advanced nature of 
scams that hold off on the request for action comes from the fact that the delay 
allows to build context where there first was none. For instance, in the widow 
example in Study I, the perpetrators attempted to disclose as much bogus infor-
mation about the made-up sender identity as possible in one message, while 
romance scams as described by Carter (2021), build this disclosure over time, 
thus allowing for the creation of personal context. However, as Study II and III 
showed, the presence of salient social contexts makes it possible for scammers, 
who are willing to quickly adapt message content, to skip the context-building 
portion of fraudulent communications and simply draw on the circumstances 
already affecting recipients. 
Additionally, being aware that perpetrators may use specific influencing 
techniques (Cialdini, 2009; Study III) in their messages can further help reci-
pients detect deception. Knowing the basics of the six principles of persuasion 
proposed by Cialdini (2009), i.e. the principles of authority, scarcity, liking, 
social proof, reciprocity and consistency, is an important tool for a more 
nuanced detection of influencing, including where this is carried out for frau-
dulent purposes. However, recognising the “Good Samaritan” and “Shock and 
Awe” approaches as these appear in received messages (Study II) functions as 
a shorthand for the more detailed principles of persuasion (Study III). This is 
because the combination of presenting a request for action and leading the 
recipient to that action by promising gains or threatening loss forms the core of 
every technology-mediated scam. Nevertheless, the way in which Cialdini’s 
principles are used in other everyday contexts such as shopping and commerce 
(see e.g. Adaji, Oyibo, & Vassileva, 2020) could prove to be a practical course 
for also introducing their application in social engineering attacks. 
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5.5 Limitations and future research 
The research presented in my thesis has some limitations. Following Branting-
ham & Brantingham (1981), there are four dimensions to understanding crime: 
the legal dimension, the offender dimension, the victim dimension and the place 
(situational) dimension. In the three empirical works and the theoretical criti-
cism that form the basis of my thesis, the legal dimension was addressed in 
Study I, while all studies dealt with the situational dimension, i.e. the mediated 
point of convergence between the perpetrator (sender) and target (recipient). 
This means that primary attention was not given to the offender and victim 
dimensions, which is both the main limitation of my thesis as well as the path-
way for future research with respect to the crime-as-communication approach. 
The message element of crime-as-communication and service providers that 
function as the mediated point of convergence element are equally important 
moving forward. The core elements of the crime-as-communication approach 
are the basic building blocks in a much wider ecosystem of technology-
mediated social engineering attacks (see Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9. The social engineering attack ecosystem: core elements, social contexts and 
research foci. 
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5.5.1 Senders: techniques and division of labour 
Criminals are known to converge in online venues to seek out co-offenders, 
request and exchange information and make plans about carrying out illegal 
activities (Leukfeldt, Kleemans, & Stol, 2017). Recent reports note that the 
cybercriminal division of labour is very complex and specialised (Proofpoint, 
2021), i.e. who provides access to the target (opens the “channel”), who produ-
ces the necessary malware (composes the “message”) and who carries out the 
attack. The first of the aforementioned – the so-called initial access brokers - are 
the likeliest to use social engineering attacks to gain access to companies’ net-
works. Previous works (see Zielinska, Welk, Mayhorn, & Murphy-Hill, 2016) 
and my thesis (Study III) have shown that the use of specific influencing tech-
niques can be detected from scam messages. Nevertheless, future research could 
further address whether the use of such techniques is a conscious choice by 
offenders based on their knowledge of these techniques or does the use rely 
more on information obtained from online venues, e.g. hacker forums, and the 
techniques are implemented merely in a formulaic manner. What is more, un-
like Cialdini’s (2009) principles of persuasion, which are not all equally present 
in every scam message, future research could certainly address perpetrators’ 
choices regarding the use of “Good Samaritan” and “Shock and Awe” (Study 
II) approaches to message production. In particular, research can address in 
more detail whether these choices in message production are influenced by the 
social circumstances, assumed psychological vulnerabilities of the targets or the 
nature of topics and themes that the perpetrators seek to exploit. 
 
 
5.5.2 Messages and service providers 
Study III showed that some criminals adapt the scams being circulated to ref-
lect salient social circumstances relatively quickly. Nevertheless, this process is 
not always without delays, which have been explained by insufficient English 
skills of the scammers (see EC News Desk, 2020 in Study III). However, 
recent developments (see Gendre, 2021) further suggest that scammers are 
widening the so-called language of cybercrime by more frequently including 
languages other than English into the production of scam messages. This causes 
severe problems for automated detection systems, which are language depen-
dent (Jain & Gupta, 2021), and further elevates the importance of deception 
detection by recipients. Some research into phishing in native languages exists 
(Kävrestad, Pettersson, & Nohlberg, 2020), but social engineering attacks per-
petrated in recipients’ native languages require more research attention moving 
forward. In particular, the focus could be on whether social engineering attacks 
carried out in recipients’ native languages are interpreted differently by the 
recipients, e.g. in terms of perceived source credibility or deception detection, 
and what role is played by the recipients’ own language skills. 
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With respect to service providers (see Figure 9), my thesis focused on social 
engineering attacks that are often carried out using media the operators of which 
are subject to strict message secrecy regulations, i.e. telecommunications com-
panies. However, the push-and-pull of content/messages between senders and 
recipients can just as well be played out using other points of mediated con-
vergence, e.g. social media platforms or online forums. A crucial question with 
respect to any point of mediated convergence is whether and, if yes, to what 
extent are the relevant operators involved in pushing content to recipients. In 
particular, this concerns social media platforms and forums that delay removal 
of disinformation or harmful content (see e.g. Bond, 2020; Kikerpill, Siibak, & 
Valli, 2021), i.e. why senders are allowed to “push” such content in the first 
place, why the mediated point of convergence delays removal or takedown 
action, and why checks on who is able to “pull” the content are relaxed. 
 
 
5.5.3 Recipients: education and aftercare 
Finally, my empirical works analysed and provided guidelines on the principle 
mechanics of social engineering attacks – i.e. diagnostically useful informa- 
tion – based on the content and context of the latter, which does not provide 
primary accounts of sender intentions and recipient reactions. However, the 
diagnostically useful information analysed in my thesis can be used in future 
educational programmes meant for people without expert interest in or know-
ledge about cybercrime. Key elements (Figure 8), i.e. knowing that scams are 
not tied to specific media; that scammers always, at some point, present an im-
plicit or explicit request for action; and that this request is always broadly based 
on either promising gains or threatening losses, are easier to convey than the 
myriad of plotlines used in scams, which can confuse the target audience (But-
ton & Cross, 2017) and should thus only serve as examples of the aforemen-
tioned principles. Therefore, future research could focus more on how to convey 
these principles to different audiences, e.g. age groups, rather than continuing 
the practice of only or primarily conveying excessive details about specific 
scams. Research could also further address questions related to those who could 
potentially convey such knowledge, e.g. parents and teachers to children, rela-
tives or social workers to the elderly, relevant public authorities to residents etc. 
The so-called “learning the hard way” side of social engineering attacks, i.e. 
the psychological and financial impacts from becoming a victim of such attacks, 
must also be front and centre in public discussions and publicly funded re-
search. As previous works (Button & Cross, 2017; Carter, 2021) and my thesis 
have shown (see also Figure 9), perpetrators of social engineering attacks most 
often simply exploit the humanity of their targets. In other words, even without 
the presence of temporary or periodic salient events, criminals are incredibly 
adept at exploiting recipients’ basic human needs to distort the perception of the 
latter regarding incoming communications. Further mapping of the ways in 
which recipients’ basic human needs are exploited in various types of social 
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engineering attacks is needed, in particular with respect to how these exploits 
relate to the dynamic understanding of vulnerability on the individual and so-
cietal levels, and in local and global contexts. This includes questions regarding 
the help and support that is available to victims of cybercrime as well as issues 
relating to the public perception and attitude towards cybercrime victims, e.g. 
victims of fraud, bullying, harassment, stalking and other forms of abuse.  
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CONCLUSION 
My thesis has focused on the diagnostically useful information that is available 
to recipients from the content and context of social engineering attacks. Follo-
wing from the premise that every activity in technology-mediated environments 
is rooted in and dependent upon communication, I have previously provided the 
theoretical background, results and discussion for establishing the crime-as-
communication approach. Understanding the strategies of persuasion and coer-
cion that perpetrators rely on to influence recipients into taking action that is 
harmful to them and knowing how these strategies appear in socially engineered 
messages is the key to detecting and countering incoming crime(-as-communi-
cation) attempts. Thus, in this Chapter, I will conclude my thesis by answering 
the research questions presented earlier (see 2.4.1): 
 
 
What diagnostically useful information is available to a recipient from the 
content and context of social engineering attacks? 
a. How can conventional crimes defined under criminal law inform the com-
municative aspects of criminal activity in mediated form?  
The offences of fraud and extortion provide important input for understanding 
crimes-as-communication as these offences rely on influencing the crime tar-
gets’ (message recipients’) will to act (Study I) and require action from the 
target, which are the hallmarks of social engineering attacks. The general ap-
proach taken by senders, i.e. persuasion or coercion, ought to be considered 
more important than the specific plotlines used in social engineering attacks. 
 
b. Which general communicative approaches appear in the production of mes-
sages used in social engineering attacks?  
I developed and analysed fraud- and extortion-type communications as these 
appeared in phishing emails (Study I) and used them as input for developing 
the gain-based “Good Samaritan” and the loss-based “Shock and Awe” ap-
proaches to message production (Study II). Study III quantified the appearance 
of the “Good Samaritan” and “Shock and Awe” approaches to message produc-
tion over the first four months of the COVID-19 pandemic (January-April 
2020), showing that 900 of 1040 scams analysed (86.5%) used the gain-based 
and 140 (13.5%) used the loss-based approach. The presence of (one of) the two 
approaches is important as diagnostically useful information. 
 
c. What role does impersonation play in social engineering attacks? 
Impersonation, including “spoofing”, plays a key role in all social engineering 
attacks even where the perpetrators choose to create non-existent identities or 
contact recipients anonymously (Study I). Study II and III showed that, salient 
social circumstances permitting, perpetrators adapt impersonation choices to 
carry out contextually fitting social engineering attacks. 
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d. Which media are used by criminals to perpetrate social engineering attacks? 
Study III showed that while email was the most popular medium for scams 
during the first four months of the COVID-19 pandemic (53.5%), phone calls 
(13.6%), text messages (12.6%), bogus websites (11.3%) and social media mes-
sages and posts (3.1%) also played a significant role. This variety of media 
allows to focus on the presence of open channels between senders and reci-
pients rather than specific media, which is key in understanding the ease with 
which criminals can establish contact with their targets (Study IV). With 
respect to providing diagnostically useful information, social engineering 
attacks should be considered as medium-independent. 
 
e. What topics and themes do criminals rely on in social engineering attacks? 
Study I showed that, under normal circumstances, criminals use generic topics 
to capture as wide an audience as possible and that the use of similar or iden-
tical themes can occur in waves. Study II and III indicated that given specific 
and salient social circumstances, criminals are adept at adapting the topics, 
themes and content of their scam messages to fit the relevant social context. 
Hence, given the relevant opportunity, some scammers adapt the topics and 
content of their scam messages in a way that reflects sudden changes in social 
circumstances, which suggests that perpetrators consider such adaptations to be 
more profitable than the generic topics used under normal circumstances.  
 
f. Which specific social-psychological influencing techniques are employed in 
social engineering attacks? 
Study III used Cialdini’s six principles of persuasion as an additional layer of 
qualitative content analysis and found empirical support for all six: authority, 
scarcity, liking, social proof, consistency and reciprocity. The fact that all six 
principles found empirical support further emphasises the extent to which 
cybercriminals go to influence crime-as-communication recipients. Knowledge 
about the use of Cialdini’s principles in other contexts, e.g. commerce, could 
provide a practical route for teaching about their use in social engineering 
attacks. 
 
g. What role does social context play in social engineering attacks? 
Study I suggested that perpetrators put more effort into crafting bogus stories 
where salient social circumstances were absent, i.e. the context for the inter-
action was established within the message itself. Study II and III showed that 
sudden changes in salient social circumstances such as the COVID-19 pande-
mic, motivate perpetrators to adjust the content of scams in order to reflect said 
circumstances. This was reflected in the themes, impersonated identities and 
choice of approach in scam message production. 
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How does the crime-as-communication approach contribute to current 
criminological thought? 
Rather than attempting to fit a ‘terrestrial’ (or conventional) understanding of 
action and convergence onto acts of cybercrime, the crime-as-communication 
approach instead builds a communication-based foundation for understanding 
action in technology-mediated environments. By making explicit the communi-
cation processes that actually constitute cybercriminal activity, the crime-as-
communication approach provides a detailed and principled way of analysing 
technology-mediated crime specifically, and action in technology-mediated en-
vironments more broadly. Moreover, the crime-as-communication approach 
emphasises the role that open channels and the interpretation of messages play 
in avoiding becoming a victim of cybercrime. Where an open channel exists, 
recipient characteristics (humans) or properties (machines) are relevant under 
the crime-as-communication approach insofar as these influence interpretations 
of incoming communications, i.e. detecting harmful or criminal input from all 
received input. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Kuritegevus kui kommunikatsioon:  
diagnostiliselt kasuliku teabe tuvastamine 
manipulatsioonirünnete sisust ja kontekstist 
Tänapäevases teabe ülekülluse tingimustes on aina sagedasemaks muutunud eri-
nevat tüüpi manipulatsiooniründed, mis jõuavad sõnumisaajateni e-kirjade, tele-
foni, lühisõnumite kui ka sotsiaalmeedia vahendusel. Tähelepanu hajutatuse, 
saabunud sõnumite tekitatud tugevate emotsioonide ning tõerääkimise eelda-
mise koostoime tõttu on manipulatsioonirünnete ohvriks langemine üha süve-
nev probleem, millega kaasneb nii majanduslik kui ka vaimne kahju. Doktori-
töö eesmärk oli teada saada, milline ründe ennetamise aspektist oluline 
teave on sõnumisaajatele kättesaadav manipulatsioonirünnete toimepane-
miseks kasutatud sõnumite sisust ja kontekstist.  
Lähtudes eeldusest, mille kohaselt tuleneb ja sõltub iga tehnoloogia vahen-
datud keskkonnas toimuv tegevus kommunikatsioonist, olen doktoritöös esita-
nud kuritegevus kui kommunikatsioon (crime-as-communication) käsituse 
loomiseks vajaliku teoreetilise tausta, tehtud uurimustest saadud tulemused ning 
käsituse vajalikkust põhjendava arutelu. Kommunikatsioonina toime pandud 
kuritegevuse tuvastamisel ja tõrjumisel on võtmetähtsusega, et sõnumite vastu-
võtja mõistaks veenmistaktikaid, millele süüteo toimepanijad tuginevad, et ajen-
dada sõnumisaajaid tegema endale kahjulikku tegu, ning seda, kuidas kõnealu-
sed veenmistaktikad manipulatsioonirünnetes kasutatavates sõnumites esinevad.  
Töö aluseks olevates uurimustes kogutud e-kirjade (Uurimus I) ja rahvus-
vahelistes meediaväljaannetes kajastatud pettuste kirjelduste (Uurimus II ja 
III) analüüsimiseks kasutasin kvalitatiivset tekstianalüüsi ning kvalitatiivset ja 
kvantitatiivset sisuanalüüsi. Uurimus IV on oma sisult teooriakriitika, mis on 
vajalik, et põhjendatult liikuda küberkuritegevuse olemasolevate käsituste juu-
rest kuritegevus kui kommunikatsioon käsituseni. Püstitasin doktoritöös kaks 
peamist uurimisküsimust, millele andsin töö tulemusel alljärgnevad vastused: 
 
1. Millist diagnostiliselt kasulikku teavet saavad sõnumisaajad manipulat-
sioonirünnete sisust ja kontekstist? 
a. Kuidas aitavad karistusõiguses määratletud konventsionaalsed ehk tavapära-
sed süüteokoosseisud mõista vahendatud kujul esinevat kuritegevust? 
Kelmuse ja väljapressimise süüteod annavad olulise panuse kuritegevus kui 
kommunikatsioon käsituse mõistmiseks, kuna kõnealused süüteod põhinevad 
süüteo sihtmärgi (sõnumi vastuvõtja) teotahte mõjutamisel (Uurimus I) ning 
eeldavad sihtmärgilt teatud teo tegemist. Nimetatud eeldused on manipulat-
sioonirünnete määravad tunnused. Üldise suhtlusviisi, mida manipulatsiooni-
rünnete toimepanijad kasutavad sõnumi vastuvõtjate teotahte mõjutamisel, ehk 
veenmise või ähvardamise kasutamise tuvastamist, tuleb pidada olulisemaks 
manipulatsioonirünnetes esinevatele konkreetsetele süžeedele keskendumisest. 
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b. Millised üldiseid kommunikatsioonivõtteid kasutatakse manipulatsiooni-
rünnete eesmärgil koostatud sõnumites? 
Pakkusin välja ja uurisin õngitsuskirjades esinevaid kelmus- ja väljapressimis-
laadseid kommunikatsiooni tüüpjuhtumeid (Uurimus I) ning kasutasin kõne-
aluseid tüüpjuhtumeid sisendina, et piiritleda ja selgitada kasusaamisel põhineva 
„hea samariitlase“ ja kahjukandmisega ähvardava „šokk ja ehmatus“ (ingl k 
shock and awe) sõnumi koostamise viiside kasutamist manipulatsioonirünnetes 
(Uurimus II). Uurimus III andis ülevaate „hea samariitlase“ ja „šokk ja ehma-
tus“ sõnumi koostamise viiside suhtelisest kasutamisest COVID-19 viirus-
pandeemia esimese nelja kuu jooksul, näidates, et 1040 manipulatsiooniründest 
900 (86,5%) puhul lähtuti kasusaamisel põhinevast ning 140 (13,5%) puhul 
kahjukandmisega ähvardavast sõnumi koostamise viisist. Vähemalt ühe eespool 
kirjeldatud sõnumi koostamise viisi tuvastamine on manipulatsiooniründe 
tuvastamise mõttes diagnostiliselt kasulik teave. 
 
c. Millist rolli omab manipulatsioonirünnetes matkimine? 
Matkimine, sh sõnumi edastajat puudutava teabe võltsimine (ingl k spoofing), 
on kesksel kohal enamustes manipulatsioonirünnetes ning seda ka juhul, kui 
sõnumite saatjad otsustavad esineda väljamõeldud isikute või asutustena või 
pöörduvad sõnumi vastuvõtjate poole anonüümselt (Uurimus I). Uurimused II 
ja III näitasid, et sobivate ühiskondlike tingimuste esinemisel viivad küber-
kurjategijad manipulatsioonirünnete sisu, näiteks matkitavad isikud ja asutused, 
sageli sotsiaalse kontekstiga vastavusse. 
 
d. Milliseid kanaleid kasutavad süüteo toimepanijad manipulatsioonirünnete 
toimepanemiseks? 
Uurimus III näitas, et kuigi COVID-19 viiruspandeemia esimese nelja kuu 
jooksul olid e-kirjad populaarseim kanal manipulatsioonirünnete toimepanemi-
seks (53,5%), kasutati manipulatsioonirünnete toimepanemiseks ka telefonikõ-
nesid (13,6%), lühisõnumeid (12,6%), võltsveebilehti (11,3%) ning sotsiaal-
meedias edastatud sõnumeid ja postitusi (3,1%). Manipulatsioonirünneteks 
kasutatavate kanalite mitmekesisus annab põhjust konkreetse kanali asemel 
esmajärgus keskenduda sõnumi saatja ja vastuvõtja vahel olemasolevale avatud 
kanalile üldisemalt, sest avatud kanali kui sellise olemasolu aitab põhjendada, 
kui lihtsalt saavad küberkurjategijad oma sihtmärkidega tänapäeva infoühis-
konnas manipulatsiooniründeks vajaliku ühenduse luua (Uurimus IV). Pettuse 
tuvastamiseks diagnostiliselt kasuliku teabe mõttes tuleks manipulatsioon-
ründeid esmajärgus käsitada kanalineutraalsetena, st kanalite iseärasustest on 
esmajärgus olulisem rõhutada sõnumi saatja ja vastuvõtja vahelise ühenduse 
võimalikkust. 
 
e. Millistele sisulistele teemadele tuginevad manipulatsioonirünnete toime-
panijad oma sõnumites? 
Uurimus I tulemused näitasid, et tavatingimustes kasutavad kurjategijad mani-
pulatsioonirünnete sõnumites üldtuntud teemasid, muutes sõnumid sedasi asja-
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kohasteks võimalikult suurele sõnumisaajate arvule, ning sarnaste teemade 
kasutamine võib manipulatsioonirünnete puhul esineda lainetena. Uurimused 
II ja III andsid kinnitust sellest, et konkreetsete ja manipulatsiooniründe mõttes 
asjakohaste ühiskondlike tingimuste olemasolul on küberkurjategijad suutelised 
sõnumites kasutatavad teemad ja sõnumite sisu kiiresti sotsiaalsele kontekstile 
sobivaks kohandama. Näiteks, COVID-19 viiruspandeemia esimestel kuudel 
usaldusväärset teavet otsivatele inimestele pakkusid kelmid „tervisenippe“ ja 
pandeemia süvenemisel rahalisi toetusi. Samuti polnud kelmidel hetkekski 
tarneprobleeme kaitsemaskide, COVID-19 ravimite ning isegi vaktsiinidega. 
Eeltoodust järeldub, et kurjategijad peavad kõnealuseid kohandamisi kuritege-
likul teel saadud kasu saamise mõttes kasumlikumaks kui seda on tavatingi-
mustes kasutatavad üldised teemad. 
 
f. Milliseid konkreetseid sotsiaalpsühooloogilisi mõjustamistehnikaid manipu-
latsioonirünnetes kasutatakse? 
Uurimuses III kasutasin kvalitatiivse sisuanalüüsi täiendava sammuna Cialdini 
kuut mõjustamispõhimõtet ning saadud tulemused andsid empiirilise kinnituse, 
et manipulatsioonirünnetes leidsid kasutust kõik kuus mõjustamispõhimõtet: 
autoriteetsus, nappus, meeldivus, sotsiaalne kinnitus, järjekindlus ning vastas-
tikkus. Asjaolu, et empiirilist kinnitust leidis kõigi kuue mõjustamispõhimõtte 
kasutamine, rõhutab veelgi küberkurjategijate tegevuse laiahaardelisust manipu-
latsioonirünnetes kasutatavate sõnumite vastuvõtjate mõjutamisel. Teadmised 
Cialdini mõjustamispõhimõtete kasutamisest muudes valdkondades, näiteks 
kaubanduses, võivad anda praktilise viisi, kuidas koolitada inimesi samu mõjus-
tamistehnikaid märkama ka manipulatsioonirünnete puhul. 
 
g. Millist rolli omab manipulatsioonirünnetes sotsiaalne kontekst? 
Uurimus I tulemused näitavad, et küberkurjategijad panustavad väljamõeldud 
lugudesse enam siis, kui puudub asjakohane sotsiaalne kontekst, mida loost 
tõepärase mulje jätmiseks ära on võimalik kasutada. Eeltoodud juhtumite puhul 
luuakse toimuva suhtluse kontekst saadetavate sõnumitega. Uurimuste II ja III 
tulemuste kohaselt ajendavad manipulatsioonirünnete mõttes asjakohases sot-
siaalses kontekstis toimuvad (järsud) muutused, näiteks COVID-19 viiruspan-
deemia tekkimine, küberkurjategijaid manipulatsioonirünnete toimepanemiseks 
kasutatavate sõnumite sisu kõnealuste muutuste kajastamiseks kohandama. Tao-
lised muudatused kajastusid sõnumites sageli kasutatud teemades, isikutes või 
asutustes, keda matkiti, ning kommunikatsioonivõtetes, millele sõnumite koos-
tamisel tugineti. 
 
2. Kuidas panustab kuritegevus kui kommunikatsioon käsitus praegusesse 
kriminoloogilisse mõtlemisse? 
Selle asemel, et allutada küberkuritegevuse juhtumid nn füüsilisele (ehk kon-
ventsionaalsele) arusaamale tegevusest ja isikutevahelisest kokkupuutest, loob 
kuritegevus kui kommunikatsioon käsitus kommunikatsioonipõhise aluse tehno-
loogia vahendatud keskkondades toimuvate tegevuste mõistmiseks. Küberkuri-
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tegelike tegevuste sisuks olevate kommunikatsiooniprotsesside esiletoomisega 
annab kuritegevus kui kommunikatsioon käsitus üksikasjaliku ja põhimõtetest 
lähtuva viisi nii tehnoloogia vahendatud kuritegevuse kui ka muude tegevuste 
mõtestamiseks ja analüüsimiseks. Eeltoodule lisaks rõhutab kuritegevus kui 
kommunikatsioon käsitus avatud kanalite ning sõnumite tõlgendamise olulisust 
küberkuritegevuse ohvriks langemise vältimises. Avatud kanali olemasolul on 
sõnumi vastuvõtja omadused – nii inimestel kui ka masinatel – kuritegevus kui 
kommunikatsioon käsituses olulised üksnes ulatuses, milles need mõjutavad 
saabuvate sõnumite tõlgendamist ehk kuritegeliku sõnumi või sisendi eristamist 
kogu saabunud teabest. 
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